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Abstract: IP licenses are the leading lady of the information age. The economic and strategic 
significance of this contract archetype have grown exponentially over the past 40 years. Under 
this glaring spotlight, it has become progressively more apparent that the legal framework 
governing these transactions is ill-suited to the role that they play in the modern digital 
environment. The applicable norms are scattered throughout diverse areas of the law, rendering 
a holistic appraisal onerous, and causing both doctrinal underdevelopment and legal 
uncertainty. Moreover, a comparative analysis of IP licensing regimes across jurisdictions 
reveals a jarring lack of alignment that severely hinders international transactions. The United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has been contemplating the 
possibility of a project in this area of the law for over a decade. Though Member States have 
battled lingering reservations, support has been increasing steadily among practitioners and 
academics, and is verging on achieving critical mass. This paper provides the necessary 
theoretical infrastructure for this initiative by expounding its possible scope, content and form. 
The objective is not to articulate or advocate a single, concrete proposal, but rather to identify 
the categories of legal issues that UNCITRAL Member States would face in the elaboration of 
this project and lend color to the types of decision-making processes required to attain 
consensus solutions. On the basis of this analysis, a strategy to advance this project to its next 
phase is proposed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The sale of goods contract archetype has played a cardinal socio-economic role since the 
adoption of currency.1 Throughout history, this prominence has prompted numerous legal 
systems to develop bespoke rules for such transactions, supplemental to general contract law.2 
                                                 
1 For an analysis of the impact of currency on both private bargains and the broader economy in ancient 
civilisations, including Mesopotamia under the Code of Hammurabi (2123-2081 BCE), and ancient Egypt see 
Paul Einzig, Primitive money, (1947). For a rich analysis also considering religious ancient sources see Benjamin 
Geva, From Commodity to Currency in Ancient History–On Commerce, Tyranny, and the Modern Law of Money, 
25 OSGOODE HALL LJ 115 (1987).  
2 On the development of commercial law throughout history see generally JAMES MACKINTOSH, ROMAN LAW OF 
SALE (1892) (on the history and development of Roman law of sale); JOHN BARON MOYLE, THE CONTRACT OF 
SALE IN THE CIVIL LAW (1892) (for a rich comparative analysis between Roman law and 19th century English law); 
Alan Rodger, The Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain, 109 L.Q. REV. 570, 574 (1992) (charting 
the history of the English commercial law codifications of the 18th century); Mary Arden, Time for an English 
Commercial Code, 56 CAMB. L.J. 516, 518–522 (1997) (reflecting on the possibility of a modern codification of 
English commercial law); ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, TREATISE ON THE CONTRACT OF SALE (Luther S. Cushing 
tran., 1839) (on the birth and development of the French law of sale); Ernst Freund, The New German Civil Code, 
HARV. LAW REV. 627 (1900) (discussing the history of commercial and civil law in Germany); REINHARD 
ZIMMERMANN, THE NEW GERMAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2006) 
(analysing the most recent developments in German commercial law); BASIL S. MARKESINIS, HANNES UNBERATH 
& ANGUS C. JOHNSTON, THE GERMAN LAW OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE (2006) (comparing 
German civil and commercial law to the common law). 
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Their purpose is to serve the peculiar issues encountered by both sellers and buyers, increasing 
systemic efficiency and legal certainty. From a comparative perspective, national laws 
governing sales have become increasingly aligned over the course of time.3 Concurrently, 
intergovernmental initiatives have progressively crafted a legal framework for international 
sale contracts, culminating in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980) (CISG).4  
In the information age, intellectual property (IP) licenses have become increasingly ubiquitous 
and their economic significance has ballooned.5 Digital technologies have disrupted numerous 
commercial sectors and enabled new business models that depend on IP license agreements 
rather than sale of goods contracts.6 As the world advances towards an ever more digital future, 
it seems probable that such trends will only amplify and proliferate. This forecast is further 
supported by recent attempts to commoditize non-exclusive license contracts and publicly trade 
them on regulated exchanges.7  
In every jurisdiction, the legal regime governing IP licenses is the product of intersections 
between multiple normative streams, including contract law, IP law, labor law, competition 
                                                 
3 See generally HENRY D. GABRIEL, CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS: A COMPARISON OF U.S. AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009) (for the perspective of the United States); Larry A DiMatteo, The Curious Case of 
Transborder Sales Law, in CISG VS. REGIONAL SALES LAW UNIFICATION: WITH A FOCUS ON THE NEW COMMON 
EUROPEAN SALES LAW, 25-57 (Magnus Ulrich ed., 2012) (focusing on international sales); 
4 For an exegesis of the CISG see generally MASSIMO C. BIANCA & MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, COMMENTARY 
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION (1987); PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & 
INGEBORG H. SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
(CISG) (2010); STEFAN KRÖLL, LOUKAS MISTELIS & PILAR HERALES VISCASILLAS, UN CONVENTION ON 
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG): COMMENTARY (2015); CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & 
STEVEN D. WALT, THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (2016). 
5 See generally MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY: THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, 
SOCIETY, AND CULTURE (2011) (for a broad socio-economic perspective); ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER SETH 
MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (2003) for an analysis 
of the impact of the information age on IP law holistically; Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, 
Designing a Global Intellectual Property System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO, and Beyond, 46 HOUS 
REV.1187 (2009) (charting the trajectory of international IP law): Bruce T. Atkins, Trading Secrets in the 
Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law Survive the Internet,  U ILL REV.1151 (1996) (specifically on trade 
secrets); Jessica Litman, Revising copyright law for the information age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19 (1996) (assessing the 
impact of the information age on copyright law); Pamela Samuelson, Toward a New Deal for Copyright in the 
Information Age, 100 MICH L. REV. 1488 (2001) (on the impact of the information age on copyright); Jane C. 
Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM-VLA JL ARTS 1 (2000) (suggesting new 
limitations for copyright law in the information age); Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Trademark Law Lost in 
Cyberspace: Trademark Protection for Internet Addresses, 9 HARV. J. L. TECH. 483 (1996) (on the impact of the 
information age on trademarks); YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (discussing the effects of networks on IP). 
6 For a primer see generally Gerald F. Davis & J. Adam Cobb, The virtual corporation, in MIT CENTER FOR 
ADVANCED ENGINEERING STUDY (1992); Henry Chesbrough & Kevin Schwartz, Innovating business models with 
co-development partnerships, 50 RES.-TECHNOL. MANAG. 55 (2007); David J. Teece, Business models, business 
strategy and innovation, 43 LONG RANGE PLANN. 172 (2010). 
7 See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Frand Market Failure: IPXI’S Standards-Essential Patent License Exchange, 
15 CHI-KENT J INTELL PROP 419 (2016) (charting the history and failure of IPXI); Merritt L. Steele, The Great 
Failure of the IPXI Experiment: Why Commoditization of Intellectual Property Failed, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 
1115 (2016) (analysing the IPXI business model in depth); Timo Fischer & Jan Leidinger, Testing patent value 
indicators on directly observed patent value—An empirical analysis of Ocean Tomo patent auctions, 43 RES. 
POLICY 519 (2014) (on auction houses specialising in IP rights). 
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law and consumer law.8 Consequently, the applicable rules and principles are difficult to 
appraise holistically, as they are scattered throughout diverse areas of the law.9 Identifying 
meticulously all the tesserae of this mosaic, deciphering completely the order in which they 
come together and comprehending the resulting picture is extremely challenging. This results 
in both legal uncertainty and doctrinal underdevelopment.10  
A comparative analysis of the national regimes for IP licenses reveals marked divergences. 
Across jurisdictions, there is a jarring lack of alignment of both the relevant branches of the 
law and the manners in which they intersect.11 Moreover, while multiple international projects 
have harmonized the foundational tenets of national legislations regulating the most prominent 
                                                 
8 See Jacques De Werra, The need to harmonize intellectual property licensing law: a European perspective, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 450–473 (Jacques De Werra ed., 2013) (vividly 
describing this confluence); RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF DODD, THE LAW OF LICENSING (2016–2017 edition ed. 
2016) §1:1. 
9 See generally, for an exhaustive analysis of the law of IP licensing in the United States NIMMER AND DODD, 
supra note 8; RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OTHER INFORMATION ASSETS 
(Second edition ed. 2007); ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND 
APPLICATIONS (2014); JAY DRATLER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2017). In Canada STUART C. 
MCCORMACK, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW OF CANADA (2 ed. 2010). In China Hong Xue, Intellectual property 
licensing in Chin, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 381–400 (Jacques de Werra 
ed., 2013). In India Nikhil Krishnamurthy, Intellectual property licensing in India, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 400–425 (2013). In Japan Shinto Teramoto, Intellectual Property Licensing 
in Japan, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 425–450 (2013). In the United 
Kingdom DAVID KEELING ET AL., KERLY’S LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES Ch 13 (15 ed. 2015); 
RICHARD MILLER ET AL., TERRELL ON THE LAW OF PATENTS Ch 16 (18 ed. 2017); COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES 
ON COPYRIGHT, (Nicholas Caddick, Gillian Davies, & Gwilym Harbottle eds., 17 ed. 2016) Ch 5 (17 ed. 2016). 
In France ALEXANDRA SCHERENBERG ABELLO, LA LICENSE DE DROITS DE PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE, 
FONDEMENT D’UNE CIRCULATION ORGANISÉE DES BIENS (2006) (for a general primer); JÉRÔME PASSA, DROIT DE 
LA PROPRIÉTÉ INDUSTRIELLE (2 ed. 2009) (on patents and trademarks licenses); MICHEL VIVANT & JEAN-MICHEL 
BRUGUIÈRE, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DROITS VOISINS (2015) (on copyright licenses). In Italy LUIGI CARLO 
UBERTAZZI, COMMENTARIO BREVE ALLE LEGGI SULLA PROPRIETÀ INTELLETTUALE E CONCORRENZA (6 ed. 2016) 
(for an exhausitve analysis); MARCO RICOLFI, TRATTATO DEI MARCHI: DIRITTO EUROPEO E NAZIONALE (2015) (on 
trademarks licenses); ALESSANDRO COGO, I CONTRATTI DI DIRITTO D’AUTORE NELL’ERA DIGITALE (2010) (on 
copyright licenses). In Germany ALEXANDER KLETT, MATTHIAS SONNTAG & STEPHAN WILSKE, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW IN GERMANY: PROTECTION, ENFORCEMENT AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2008); MARTIN 
AUFENANGER, GERHARD BARTH & ANJA FRANKE, THE GERMAN TRADEMARK ACT: DAS DEUTSCHE 
MARKENGESETZ (3 ed. 2006) (on trademarks licenses); HANS-JÜRGEN AHRENS & MARY-ROSE MCGUIRE, MODEL 
LAW ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A PROPOSAL FOR GERMAN LAW REFORM (2013) (discussing legal reform 
proposals). Under EU law ANNETTE KUR & THOMAS DREIER, EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: TEXT, 
CASES AND MATERIALS (2013); IRINI STAMATOUDI & PAUL TORREMANS, EU COPYRIGHT LAW: A COMMENTARY 
(2014); JUSTINE PILA & PAUL TORREMANS, EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2016); JUSTINE PILA & 
CHRISTOPHER WADLOW, THE UNITARY EU PATENT SYSTEM (2015); P. A. C. E. VAN DER KOOIJ & DIRK JOHAN 
GERARD VISSER, EU IP LAW: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2015); 
ANNETTE KUR & MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, EUROPEAN TRADE MARK LAW (2016); Alain Strowel & Bernard 
Vanbrabant, Copyright licensing a European view,  in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LICENSING 29–54 (Jacques De Werra ed., 2013); MICHELE BERTANI, DIRITTO D’AUTORE EUROPEO (2011); Lucie 
Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Study on the conditions applicable to contracts relating to intellectual property 
in the European Union,  (2002), available at http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/24667. 
10 See Jacques De Werra, Moving beyond the Conflict between Freedom of Contract and Copyright Policies: In 
Search of a New Global Policy for Online Information Licensing Transactions-A Comparative Analysis between 
US Law and European Law, 25 COLUM JL ARTS 239 (2001) (forcefully making this point in his comparative 
analysis between United States and European licensing laws). 
11 See generally De Werra, supra note 8; Michael Anthony C. Dizon, The symbiotic relationship between global 
contracts and the international IP regime, 4 J. INTELLECT. PROP. LAW PRACT. 559, 564 (2009). 
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IP rights archetypes,12 similar initiatives devoted to the law governing contractual dealings 
involving IP rights and license agreements have borne meagre fruit.13  
Legal practitioners, academics, non-governmental entities and international organizations alike 
have long mooted ameliorations to the legal framework governing IP licenses both nationally 
and internationally.14 In some jurisdictions, this has led to government-commissioned reviews, 
which scrutinized the extant body of rules and recommended legislative interventions.15 
Among international organizations, the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Laws (UNCITRAL)16 has cautiously yet persistently expressed interest in a future work 
exploring the legal framework of IP license contracts.17 Despite this, none of the UNCITRAL 
                                                 
12 A list of the primary international IP treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) is available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/index.html. For commentary on these sources see generally 
SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS, V 1-2: THE 
BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND (2005); JÖRG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES 1996: 
THE WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATY AND THE WIPO PERFORMANCES AND PHONOGRAMS TREATY: COMMENTARY AND 
LEGAL ANALYSIS (2002); SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY (2008); SAM 
RICKETSON, THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY: A COMMENTARY (2015); 
DIETER STAUDER, 2 EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (2003); JON NELSON, INTERNATIONAL 
PATENT TREATIES: WITH COMMENTARY (2007); ELLEN P. WINNER & AARON W. DENBERG, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADEMARK TREATIES WITH COMMENTARY (2004); Carlos Correa, Trade related aspects of intellectual property 
rights: a commentary on the TRIPS agreement,  OUP CAT. (2007); FRIEDRICH-KARL BEIER & GERHARD 
SCHRICKER, FROM GATT TO TRIPS: THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1996); JUSTIN MALBON, CHARLES LAWSON & MARK DAVISON, THE WTO AGREEMENT ON 
TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY (2014); IRENE CALBOLI & 
JACQUES DE WERRA, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TRADEMARK TRANSACTIONS: A GLOBAL AND LOCAL OUTLOOK 
(2016); JUSTINE PILA & ANSGAR OHLY, THE EUROPEANIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: TOWARDS A 
EUROPEAN LEGAL METHODOLOGY (2013) (for critical reflections on the harmonisation of substantive IP law in 
the European Union).  
13 For one of the few examples of intergovernmental initiatives focused on licensing law see the WIPO 
SUCCESSFUL TECHNOLOGY LICENSING GUIDE 
(http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/licensing/903/wipo_pub_903.pdf).   
14 See generally Alain Strowel, Quelle codification pour la propriété intellectuelle?,  TIJDSCHR. OOR NED. 
BURGELIJK RECHT 248 (1995); De Werra, supra note 8; Dizon, supra note 11; Lorin Brennan & Jeff Dodd, A 
concept proposal for a model intellectual property commercial law,  in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LICENSING 257–281 (Jacques de Werra ed., 2013); Mark Anderson, International Patent Licensing,  in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 126–155 (Jacques de Werra ed., 2013); The 
European copyright code developed by the Wittem Group sought to develop model provisions for copyright 
including copyright licensing EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT CODE: THE WITTEM PROJECT, (2010); for an overview of 
the Wittem Code Eleonora Rosati, The Wittem Group and the European Copyright Code, 5 J. INTELLECT. PROP. 
LAW PRACT. 862 (2010). For observations on the state of the law governing IP licensing in the EU see European 
Commission, Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights Boosting creativity and innovation to provide 
economic growth, high quality jobs and first class products and services in Europe (COM(201l)287 final).  
15 For example, in the United Kingdom see ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
(2006); Ian Hargreaves, Digital opportunity: a review of intellectual property and growth: an independent report, 
(2011), http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/16295/7/ipreview-finalreport_Redacted.pdf (last visited Sep 7, 2017). The British 
Government broadly accepted these recommendations, yet has been slow in implementing them 
(http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresponse-full.pdf). 
16 On the history and working method of UNCITRAL see Andrea Tosato, The UNCITRAL Annex on security 
rights in IP: a work in progress, 4 J. INTELLECT. PROP. LAW PRACT. 743, 743–745 (2009); SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB & 
TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CRAFTING OF WORLD 
MARKETS (2017) (for both a legal and sociological analysis of the work of UNCITRAL); Steve Charnovitz, 
Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT. LAW 348 (2006) (on the role of NGOs 
in intergovernmental organizations); Allan E. Farnsworth, UNCITRAL-Why? What? How? When?  Am. J. Comp. 
Law 314 (1972); Peter H. Pfund, Overview of the Codification Process, 15 Brook J Intl L 7 (1989). 
17 At the time of its foundation, UNCITRAL identified nine subject matters for its future endeavors, including 
Intellectual Property; see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Third Session, Supplement No. 16 
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Member States (henceforth: Member States) have yet explicitly championed such an initiative 
nor shown willingness to submit an official proposal for the consideration of the UNCITRAL 
Commission.18 
At the UNCITRAL Fourth Colloquium on Secured Transactions,19 panelists discussed the topic 
of “IP licensing”,20 examining the problems fettering the law regulating these agreements in 
many jurisdictions and focusing on the oft-fraught dialogue between contract and IP law. This 
was followed by a debate on a hypothetical UNCITRAL project on the law of voluntary IP 
licenses (henceforth: the Project), which would be aimed at fostering improvements to national 
legal regimes and stimulating international harmonization. This paper aspires to advance the 
aforementioned discourse. 
It would be entirely premature to formulate a precise and detailed proposal for the Project at 
this stage. This paper instead ventures to examine methodically three salient points that are 
logical prerequisites to crafting a conscientiously-formed proposal. First, attention will be 
devoted to the potential scope of the Project. Secondly, a comparative analysis of the 
substantive rules governing IP license contracts will be conducted, for the dual purpose of 
providing representative examples of the types of legal conundrums that Member States would 
have to tackle at the heart of the Project and expounding the decision-making processes 
required to conceive consensus21 solutions. Thirdly, an assessment will be conducted of the 
possible, alternative forms that the Project could assume and their associated ramifications. 
Lastly, concluding observations will recommend a strategy for the advancement of the Project 
to its next phase.  
I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROJECT 
As a logical antecedent to any foray into matters of substance, Member States would be 
required to define the scope of Project. As IP license contracts are a vast and diverse archetype, 
this determination would be demanding. It is submitted that a scrupulous decision-making 
process would involve an assessment of two distinct legal dimensions. 
                                                 
(A/7216) (1968), paras. 40 and 48. Future work on the legal framework of IP licenses at both national and 
international level has been under consideration at UNCITRAL for some time: see UNCITRAL Report of 
Working Group VI (Security Interests) on the work of its fourteenth session A/CN.9/667, para. 141; Report of 
Working Group VI (Security Interests) on the work of its fifteenth session A/CN.9/670, paras. 123-126: “With 
respect to a contractual guide on intellectual property licensing, it was observed that it would be an extremely 
important project, which would address key issues of law relating to intellectual property”; Planned and possible 
future work A/CN.9/774 para 11; Planned and possible future work A/CN.9/807 para 13; Planned and possible 
future work A/CN.9/841 para 14.  
18 For an examples of recent Member State proposals see Proposal by Switzerland on possible future work by 
UNCITRAL in the area of international contract law A/CN.9/758; Proposal by the Government of the United 
States regarding UNCITRAL future work A/CN.9/789. 
19 UNCITRAL Vienna 15-17 March 2017, programme available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/colloquia/4thSecTrans/4th_Int._Coll_on_ST_2017_r.pdf. This Panel 
continued developing themes initially explored during the UNCITRAL Third International Colloquium on 
Secured Transactions, March 1-3, 2010, Vienna, where a panel titled a "Concept Proposal for a Model Intellectual 
Property Contracting Law" was held, programme available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/colloquia/3rdint.html. 
20 The panellists were Jeff Dodd (Chair), Lorin Brennan, Thilo Agthe and Andrea Tosato. All materials are 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/colloquia_security.html.  
21 It is an established practice that UNCITRAL only takes decisions by consensus. See Note by the Secretariat: 
UNCITRAL rules of procedure and methods of work (A/CN.9/638/Add.4), section III, I.2 Decision-making in 
the Commission, available at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V07/875/89/PDF/V0787589.pdf?OpenElement 
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First, IP licenses impact a sweeping range of socio-economic interests, giving rise to legal 
issues that differ in nature and are thus governed by rules that stem from multiple areas of the 
law. Structurally, IP licenses are binding promises between persons; they generate private law 
questions that are answered by contract law. Functionally, they are dealings for the purpose of 
exploiting IP rights; they engender issues that are proprietary in nature and fall within the realm 
of IP law. Concurrently, IP licenses can also attract the attention of competition law, labor law, 
consumer protection law and international private law, depending on the content of the 
undertakings stipulated by the parties.  
In approaching this dimension, it would be for Member States to decide whether the Project 
should engage with all these branches of the law or rather concentrate on a narrower selection. 
At first glance, it might appear unproblematic to exclude delimited areas a priori, such as 
consumer protection or unfair competition. A more rigorous analysis, however, reveals that 
compartmentalizing IP license contracts is conceptually Gordian, as issues pertaining to 
discrete branches of the law can be closely intertwined and difficult to address in isolation. 
This would be especially true with regard to contract law and IP law, as license agreements are 
often characterized by a coalescence of obligatory and proprietary profiles, owing to the nature 
and function of these transactions. 
Secondly, IP licenses cannot be described as a homogeneous category. These contracts all share 
a functional core: the licensor grants to the licensee a form of permission to perform actions 
that would otherwise be an infringement of the licensed IP.22 Nevertheless, the rights and 
obligations of the parties vary markedly depending on multifarious structural elements. The 
nature and quantity of the licensed IP rights, the breadth and limitations of the grant, the 
compensation structure, and the legal status of the parties, can all profoundly affect the 
respective legal spheres of the licensor and licensee.  
In approaching this second dimension, it would be for Member States to deliberate whether the 
Project should encompass all license agreements without exception, or rather delve into a sub-
group of this category. In the former case, the Project would seek to articulate a ruleset that 
concentrates on the functional core of IP licenses, yet eschew delving into the singularities of 
the many existing incarnations of these contracts. Its emphasis would be on pinpointing 
problems and elaborating solutions that apply to all types of IP licenses uniformly. 
Coextensively, caution would be required to ensure that unintended consequences were not 
inflicted on the regime of any one type of license agreement.  
Alternatively, if Member States decided that the scope of the Project should be confined to 
licenses with particular attributes, the objective would be to conduct an exhaustive study into 
the designated subject matter; for example, Member States might elect to focus exclusively on 
licenses that involve a pre-determined form of IP, are international in nature, are entered into 
by legal persons, or have a specific commercial structure. The notable advantage of limiting 
the types of licenses encompassed by the Project is that it would mitigate the risk of unintended 
consequences arising from the broad-brush strokes required when addressing all these 
transactions as a unitary subject matter. Nevertheless, it would be challenging to target a sub-
group of licenses characterized by socio-legal singularities sufficient to merit its own set of 
rules and the associated systemic fragmentation cost.  
                                                 
22 This common functional core is recognized ubiquitously; Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 (for a 
European law perspective) 3.2.2; NIMMER AND DODD, supra note 8 § 1:2 (for United States perspective); Xue, 
supra note 9 (for a Chinese law perspective); Krishnamurthy, supra note 9 (for an Indian law perspective); in 
Japanese law Teramoto, supra note 9.  
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Thus, the determination of the scope of the Project would present Member States with a vast 
spectrum of options. At one extreme, a wide remit embracing all license types and the totality 
of legal issues that they elicit, regardless of the area of the law to which they pertain. At the 
other, a narrow scope, comprising only licenses with very peculiarities attributes and only 
tackling profiles that relate to one branch of the law. This would be a cardinal policy choice 
with far-reaching ramifications, as will be shown in subsequent paragraphs devoted to 
substantive rules. 
II. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROJECT 
It would be beyond the editorial limits of this contribution to explore exhaustively all facets of 
the body of rules governing IP license agreements that the Project may investigate.  
Attention will be directed to seven problematic areas that possess doctrinal complexity, carry 
commercial relevance and are indicative of the conceptual challenges faced by Member States. 
For each area, this paper will conduct a tripartite analysis: first, describing briefly the current 
state of the law across jurisdictions; secondly, assessing whether the current rules realize a 
satisfactory legal regime and appraising the degree of international dissonance; thirdly, 
theorizing the methodological approaches that Member States might adopt to confront these 
issues in the Project and, to a lesser extent, the type of substantive rules they might consider.  
A. Licensing of jointly owned IP rights 
It is uniformly accepted that rights-holders can license their IP.23 However, the legal regime 
for the licensing of jointly-owned24 rights varies markedly across jurisdictions.25 From a 
systemic perspective, most states establish special IP rules to regulate the licensing of jointly-
owned IP rights, yet there are some in which such matters are governed by general property 
law tenets;26 these norms are typically subsidiary in nature, yet there are exceptions.27 
Crucially, with regard to substance, most jurisdictions lack a unitary approach, adopting 
heterogeneous regimes for different types of IP rights.28 In some, licenses can be granted by 
                                                 
23 IP licensing has ancient roots, dating back to the Venetian Patent Statute of 1474; see generally J. Kostylo, 
Commentary on the Venetian Statute on Industrial Brevets (1474), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-
1900) (Lionel Bently & Martin Kretschmer eds., 2008) (detailing the 1474 Venetian patent system). For a 
historical analysis of copyright licensing predating the statutory introduced in the 18th Century starting with the 
watershed of the Copyright Act 1710 8 Ann C. 19, see HARRY HUNTT RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE: 
AN ESSAY ON AN ACT FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF LEARNING, 1710 (1956).  
24 Co-ownership of IP rights is accepted ubiquitously, see AIPPI The Impact of Co-Ownership of Intellectual 
Property Rights on their Exploitation (Q194) [henceforth Q194] Summary Report available at http://aippi.org/wp-
content/uploads/committees/194/SR194English.pdf. The sole exception of notice lies in Brazilian Trademarks 
law, as the Brazilian Patent and Trademark Office does not allow joint-application and registration of jointly-
owned trademarks, see AIPPI Brazil Report Q194 available at http://aippi.org/wp-
content/uploads/committees/194/GR194brazil.pdf. 
25 For an exhaustive collection of primary sources and a comparative analysis see AIPPI Q194 national reports 
available at http://aippi.org/committee/the-impact-of-co-ownership-of-intellectual-property-rights-on-their-
exploitation/.  
26 Notable examples are German patent law, see AIPPI Germany Report Q194 available at http://aippi.org/wp-
content/uploads/committees/194/GR194germany_en.pdf; and Canadian Patent Law, see AIPPI Canada Report 
Q194 available at http://aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/committees/194/GR194canada.pdf. 
27 Chinese copyright co-ownership rules for creations of employees of public companies are imperative, see AIPPI 
China Report Q194 available at http://aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/committees/194/GR194china.pdf. The same 
is true of all Bulgarian copyright co-ownership statutory provisions, see AIPPI Bulgaria Report Q194 available at 
http://aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/committees/194/GR194bulgaria.pdf. 
28 This emerges lucidly from the AIPPI Q194 national reports, supra note 24 and the AIPPI Summary Report 
Q194 available at http://aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/committees/194/SR194English.pdf. 
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one co-owner, absent the consent or knowledge of the other joint owners.29 In others, the 
consent of all co-owners is a validity requirement.30 In others still, this prerequisite only covers 
exclusive licenses.31 The resulting legal landscape is disjointed and beset with legal 
uncertainty,32 increasing transaction costs, elevating market-access barriers, and obstructing 
innovation.33 
The Project should consider advocating a normative approach to the licensing of jointly-owned 
IP rights. It would be for Member States to consider two distinct, yet logically contiguous 
issues. First, they would have to decide whether a right-holder can ever grant a license without 
the consent of their joint-owners. The cardinal query is whether it is acceptable for a joint 
owner to suffer a detrition of their exclusive right without their consent, even at the hands of 
one of their fellow co-owners. Systemically, the competing legal interests are the erga omnes 
nature of IP and the right to exploit and dispose of these rights.34 If an affirmative answer were 
provided to this cardinal query, Member States would be faced with the task of defining 
precisely the circumstances in which a right-holder is at liberty to grant licenses. As national 
laws lack alignment on this matter, compromise would not be easy.   
Secondly, it would be for Member States to regulate the position of a person who enters into a 
license agreement with a right-holder who failed to obtain the required consent of their joint-
owners. Here, the tension is between co-owners unwilling to suffer a deterioration of their 
exclusive right and licensees who have legitimate expectations of exploiting the permission 
they have contractually obtained. In this context, The rival legal interests are, on one hand, 
upholding the “certainty” of the absolute nature of IP rights and, on the other, ensuring the 
“certainty” of commercial dealings.35 Mutatis mutandis this is a conundrum analogous to that 
                                                 
29 In the United States, this is the regime applicable to jointly owned patents under 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1994), 
copyright  
30 For example, in the United Kingdom, the consent of all co-owners is required for the granting of patent licenses 
under section 36 United Kingdom Patents Act 1979 [henceforth UK PA]; the same is true under section 173(2) UK 
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988) [henceforth CDPA]; the same is true under section 50 of the India 
Patents Act 1970 and the Australia Patents Act 1990 § 16. 
31 This is the regime governing licenses of jointly-owned copyrights in the United States, under 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) 
(1978), as held in Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2008); see MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 6.10-611 (2013) (“one joint owner may grant a 
nonexclusive license in the entire work without consent of the other joint owners”). This is also the principle 
governing the licensing of jointly-owned patents in China under Art 15 Chinese Patent Act (2009); for an in-depth 
analysis see Yunling Ren & Yan Hong, Rights of Joint Patent Owners in China, 11 JOHN MARSHALL REV. 
INTELLECT. PROP. LAW [i], 622 (2011). 
32 This sentiment was strongly voiced in several AIPPI Q194 national reports, supra note 24.  
33 These issues are particularly noticeable in markets were entrants require multiple licenses to compete with the 
incumbents; see generally Hargreaves, supra note 15 at 5; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal 
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8-11,24-26, 29-32 
(2000); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the patent thicket: Cross licenses, patent pools, and standard setting, 1 INNOV. 
POLICY ECON. 119 (2000) (suggesting strategies to efficiently collect the required licenses); Sonia Baldia, The 
transaction cost problem in international intellectual property exchange and innovation markets, 34 NW. J. INTL. 
BUS. 1 (2013) (who highlights that the territoriality characterizing IP licensing increase uncertainty and costs).  
34 For a law and economics perspective on this general conundrum see Clifford G. Holderness, Joint ownership 
and alienability, 23 INT. REV. LAW ECON. 75 (2003) (dividing all possible regimes for jointly holding property 
into four classes); for an analysis of the legal regime of joint ownership of copyright moral rights, see Peter H. 
Karlen, Joint Ownership of Moral Rights Part I, 38 J. COPYR. SOC. USA 242 (1990). 
35 The dichotomy between ‘certainty of rights’ and ‘certainty of transactions’ has been explored thoroughly in 
German legal scholarship; seminally see Víctor Ehrenberg, Rechtssicherheit und Verkehrssicherheit, 47 JHERINGS 
JAHRB. 273 (1904); for a common law perspective see Mitchell Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of 
Transaction: La Possession Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589 (1931).  
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faced when elaborating principles to adjudicate conflicts stemming from transfers of title by 
non-owners (traditio a non domino);36 with the crucial distinction that a licensee in this position 
cannot acquire material and exclusive control of the subject matter of a license due to its 
intangible nature but merely venture to perform activities falling within the scope of the 
improperly licensed IP.37 
In principle, there is an ample spectrum of possible solutions. At one end, unreserved protection 
of the property rights of the non-consenting joint-owner, directing the licensee to take action 
against their injudicious licensor; at the other, unexempted upholding of the granted license, 
eroding the breadth of the proprietary right of the nonconsenting joint-owners and granting 
them recourse against the licensors. Amid these extremes lie a multitude of intermediate 
solutions, allowing for exceptions in scenarios where, for example, the non-consenting joint-
owner failed to act promptly, the licensee was misled, the license was not granted for value, or 
the licensee had knowledge of the existence of the joint-owners.38 
Faced with such a broad variety of possibly normative solutions, it is submitted that a two-
stage decision-making process would be apt to steer Member States towards a consensus. At 
the outset, a fundamental decision would be required, deliberating whether the interest of the 
licensee or that of the non-consenting co-owner should be favored, as a general rule. This would 
be followed by the careful integration of exceptions aimed at mitigating the inflexibility that 
would otherwise flow from an unrestricted application of the adopted general norm. These 
choices would greatly benefit from a law and economics approach of the alternatives under 
consideration, coupled with a comparative assessment of the positive law in force across 
different jurisdictions. 
Interestingly, the licensing of jointly-owned IP rights furnishes a felicitous example of the type 
of issue that would be at the heart of a broadly-scoped Project. Member States, fueled by 
                                                 
36 The body of scholarship on this topic is vast. For present purposes comparative law scholarship is particularly 
illuminating; see Franklin, supra note 35; Jean-Georges Sauveplanne, The protection of the bona fide purchaser 
of corporeal movables in Comparative Law,  RABELS Z. FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES INT. PRIV. RABEL J. COMP. INT. 
PRIV. LAW 651 (1965); Rodolfo Sacco, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. LAW 171 (2001); 
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the laws of good faith purchase,  COLUMBIA LAW REV. 1332 (2011); 
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Carmine Guerriero, Law and culture: a theory of comparative variation in bona fide 
purchase rules, 35 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 543 (2015); for a thorough historical and comparative analysis of European 
law on this topic see Arthur F. Salomons, How to draft new rules on the bona fide acquisition of movables for 
Europe? Some remarks on method and content, in RULES FOR THE TRANSFER OF MOVABLES: A CANDIDATE FOR 
EUROPEAN HARMONISATION OR NATIONAL REFORMS? 141–154 (Wolfgang Faber & Brigitta Lurger eds., 2008). 
37 See Mary-Rose McGuire, Intellectual Property Rights: ‘Property’ or ‘Right’? The Application of the Transfer 
Rules to Intellectual Property, in RULES FOR THE TRANSFER OF MOVABLES: A CANDIDATE FOR EUROPEAN 
HARMONISATION OR NATIONAL REFORMS? 217–236 (Wolfgang Faber & Wolfgang Faber eds., 2009); Alice 
Haemmerli, Why Doctrine Matters: Patent and Copyright Licensing and the Meaning of Ownership in Federal 
Context, 30 COLUM JL ARTS 1 (providing a primer of the bona fide purchaser rules applicable to copyright and 
patent assignments in the United States and hypothesising their applicability to licenses). Interestingly, the Italian 
Copyright Statute, Law No. 63 of Apr. 22, 1941 [henceforth Italian Copyright Law], article 167 appears to draw 
an analogy between the legal positions of a good faith purchaser in possession and that of a person who exercises 
copyright de facto; see UBERTAZZI, supra note 9 commentary to article 167 Italian Copyright law. 
38 These are some of the factors most typically considered by national legislations when dealing with the conflict 
between a dispossessed owner and a good faith purchaser; see generally Dari-Mattiacci and Guerriero, supra note 
36 (providing a law and economics analysis); Sacco, supra note 36 (for a comparative approach in the context of 
international sales); Salomons, supra note 36 (for a normative approach to the conundrum of bona fide purchasers 
vis-a-vis unlawfully dispossessed owners).  
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frustration with present levels of national fragmentation and international disharmony,39 might 
find a unitary approach to this matter singularly palatable.  
B. Pre-contractual negotiations 
Private law has traditionally taken a keen interest in pre-contractual negotiations, yet the 
approaches adopted vary markedly, both methodologically and substantively, across 
jurisdictions.40 Historically, IP legislation has not introduced special rules for the negotiations 
of license contracts; even in legal orders with a propensity to scrutinize negotiations closely, 
IP law has not strayed from the general contract law regime. 
In the past, IP license negotiations predominantly took place either between businesses, or 
individual IP rights holders and businesses. These transactions were largely domestic, featured 
grants over a small number of IP rights, and involved a linear compensation structure; typically, 
such agreements were preceded by interactions of limited profundity that involved insubstantial 
exchanges of information.41  
Over the past fifty years, the landscape of IP license negotiations has evolved. In the high-
volume, low-value market segment, the mass distribution of digital products and services has 
                                                 
39 As evidenced in the AIPPI Resolution Q194 available at http://aippi.org/wp-
content/uploads/committees/194/RS194English.pdf. 
40 For a comparative overview see generally PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY: REPORTS TO THE XIIITH CONGRESS, 
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW, MONTREAL, CANADA, 18-24 AUGUST 1990, (E. H. Hondius 
ed., 1991); for an analysis on the basis of the methodology of the Trento Common Core Project see 
PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, (John Cartwright & Martijn Hesselink eds., 2008); for 
a European law primer PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND. MODEL RULES OF. EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW. DRAFT 
COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE, (Christian von Bar & Eric Clive eds., 2010) Art II-3:301 [henceforth D.C.F.R.]. 
For an analysis from the perspective of United States law see Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in 
contrahendo, bargaining in good faith, and freedom of contract: A comparative study, 77 HARV. LAW REV. 401 
(1964); Allan E. Farnsworth, Precontractual liability and preliminary agreements: fair dealing and failed 
negotiations, 87 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 217 (1987); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual liability and 
preliminary agreements, 120 HARV. LAW REV. 661 (2006). For an analysis of private law international instruments 
see John Klein & Carla Bachechi, Precontractual Liability and the Duty of Good Faith Negotiation in 
International Transactions, 17 HOUS J INTL L 1 (1994); Franco Ferrari, Uniform interpretation of the 1980 
uniform Sales Law, 24 GA J INTL COMP L 183, 190–192 (1994); Allan E. Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing Under the UNIDROIT Principles, Relevant International Conventions, and National Laws, 3 TUL J 
INTL COMP L 47 (1995); Diane Madeline Goderre, International Negotiations Gone Sour: Precontractual Liability 
Under the United Nations Sales Convention, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 257 (1997); SCHLECHTRIEM AND SCHWENZER, 
supra note 5; KRÖLL, MISTELIS, AND VISCASILLAS, supra note 5. 
41 This picture emerges lucidly from a variety of studies into the historical trajectory of IP law; see generally Frank 
D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, J. PAT. OFF. SOC. 711 (1944) (focusing primarily 
the pre-1709 realities); Ove Granstrand & others, The economics and management of intellectual property,  
BOOKS (1999) (for an economic history); Paul A. David, Intellectual property institutions and the panda’s thumb: 
Patents, copyrights, and trade secrets in economic theory and history,  in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Mary E. Mogee, & Robin A. Schoen 
eds., 1993) (for a comprehensive history of the international IP law framework); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) 
property and sovereignty: Notes toward a cultural geography of authorship,  STANFORD LAW REV. 1293 (1996); 
seminally on trademarks FRANK ISAAC SCHECHTER, 1 THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO 
TRADE-MARKS (1925); BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, 1 THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW (1999) (for an English law perspective); CATHERINE SEVILLE, 8 THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF COPYRIGHT 
LAW: BOOKS, BUCCANEERS AND THE BLACK FLAG IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2006) (focusing on the Anglo-
American book trade); CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL 
HISTORY (2006); Petra Moser, Patents and Innovation: Evidence from Economic History, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 
23 (2013) (focusing on patent licensing).  
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irreversibly brought consumers into the factual matrix of IP license negotiations;42 the feverish 
propagation of the internet of things will further promulgate this trend, as sales contracts for 
tangible goods will be increasingly coupled with grants of licenses over the associated IP.43 In 
the low-volume, high-value market segment, international licensing and cross-licensing deals 
of entire IP portfolios have acquired substantial strategic significance. Parties’ interactions 
preceding these transactions involve exchanges of large quantities of information, and can give 
rise to confidentiality issues.44 
In recent past, European jurisdictions have begun to recalibrate their consumer protection 
legislation to address this new environment, also reviewing pre-contractual interactions 
preceding IP licenses.45 Concurrently, academics have begun to query more insistently whether 
extant private law rules possess sufficient elasticity to accommodate these developments.46  
Thus, the Project may consider whether the legal framework of IP licenses might benefit from 
special rules governing pre-contractual negotiations. It is submitted that this determination 
would be buttressed by a decision-making process divided into two logically-distinct stages. In 
the first, it would be for Member States to ascertain the existence of untoward conduct patterns 
during negotiations of IP licenses that are inadequately regulated by typical private law 
safeguards; for example, especially uneven bargaining positions or idiosyncratic information 
                                                 
42 Empirical research of on-line consumer contracts provides robust evidence of this phenomenon, ex multis see 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a standard form contract? an empirical analysis of software license 
agreements, 4 J. EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 677 (2007); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of 
Standard Form Contracts: The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 447 (2008); Yannis 
Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does anyone read the fine print? Consumer attention to 
standard-form contracts, 43 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2014); Daniel B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Software 
Development: The Enforceability of Mass-Market Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J. LAW TECHNOL. 1 (2000) 
(offering insights into the software market).   
43 For a broad overview see Gerd Kortuem et al., Smart objects as building blocks for the internet of things, 14 
IEEE INTERNET COMPUT. 44 (2010); Peng-fei Fan & Guang-zhao Zhou, Analysis of the business model innovation 
of the technology of internet of things in postal logistics, in INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND ENGINEERING 
MANAGEMENT (IE&EM), 2011 IEEE 18TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 532–536 (2011), 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/6035215/ (last visited Sep 8, 2017); Remco M. Dijkman et al., 
Business models for the Internet of Things, 35 INT. J. INF. MANAG. 672 (2015). 
44 For an empirical survey of the behaviour in the US semiconductor industry see Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie 
Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor 
Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2001); Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing intellectual 
capital: licensing and cross-licensing in semiconductors and electronics, 39 CALIF. MANAGE. REV. 8 (1997); 
Robert H. Pitkethly, Intellectual property strategy in Japanese and UK companies: patent licensing decisions and 
learning opportunities, 30 RES. POLICY 425 (2001) (comparing the behaviour of Japanese and UK entities). 
45 The European Union has been leading the way on this particular front; see HANS SCHULTE-NÖLKE, CHRISTIAN 
TWIGG-FLESNER & MARTIN EBERS, EC CONSUMER LAW COMPENDIUM: THE CONSUMER ACQUIS AND ITS 
TRANSPOSITION IN THE MEMBER STATES (2008) (for a comparative European law primer); STEPHEN WEATHERILL, 
EU CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY (2013) (for a systematic analysis of European Union consumer law); Peter 
Cartwright, Redress compliance and choice: Enhanced Consumer Measures and the retreat from punishment in 
the Consumer Rights Act 2015, 75 CAMB. LAW J. 271 (2016) (examining recent UK law reforms). 
46 See Christian Twigg-Flesner, Innovation and EU Consumer Law, 28 J. CONSUM. POLICY 409 (2005) 
(presciently predicting future developments in the Community Acquis); Stefan Grundmann, Targeted consumer 
protection,  in THE IMAGES OF THE CONSUMER IN EU LAW : LEGISLATION, FREE MOVEMENT AND COMPETITION LAW 
223–244 (Stephen Weatherill & Dorota Leczykiewicz eds., 2016) (considering the need for tailored consumer 
protection rules); GERAINT G. HOWELLS & THOMAS WILHELMSSON, EC CONSUMER LAW 175–186 (2017) (for 
forward-looking considerations); Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell & Adam Thierer, The Sharing 
Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J BUS ENTREP. L 529 (2014) (for 
North-American perspectives). The European Union discusses some of these challenges in its Green Paper on the 
Review of the Consumer Acquis, COM(2006) 744 final.  
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asynchronies that fundamentally skew the balance of the ensuing agreement, encouraging rent 
seeking and engendering market failures.47 If this enquiry were unanimously answered in the 
affirmative, the subsequent step would be to identify normative interventions capable of 
remedying these mischiefs and ultimately, a selection of the preferable options.48 
Notably, the scope of the Project would markedly affect the palatability of a set of special rules 
governing negotiations of IP licenses. If its remit were broad, both in terms of relevant areas 
of the law and license types, the magnitude and diversity of the subject matter under 
consideration would render the recognition of common issues challenging. A wide range of 
transactions would need to be parsed, alongside extensive empirical evidence from an array of 
subjects and economic sectors. In similar vein, the divergences that exist between the legal 
approaches adopted across jurisdictions to regulate negotiations would render agreement on 
the substantive rules to be adopted by the Project arduous to achieve.  
If the scope of Project were narrow, the aforementioned difficulties would be markedly 
reduced. Analyzing a subset of transaction archetypes would simplify the task of identifying 
legal wrongs and the agreement of substantive rules to resolve them. However, it should be 
noted that introducing special rules that only regulate negotiations of a small group of IP 
licenses would carry a hefty price for systemic fragmentation. 
C. Formation 
Contract formation is shaped by private law tenets. Though there are differences between 
common and civil law systems, a degree of conceptual uniformity does pervade across 
jurisdictions.49 IP law establishes but few exceptions to this body of rules, otherwise 
conforming to it unreservedly.50   
                                                 
47 For empirical research into the problems experienced by European consumers in the digital services market see 
EUROPE ECONOMICS, DIGITAL CONTENT SERVICES FOR CONSUMERS: ASSESSMENT OF PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED BY 
CONSUMERS (LOT 1), REPORT 4: FINAL REPORT (2011), https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/content/digital-content-
services-consumers-assessment-problems-experienced-consumers-lot-1-report-4. 
48 For example, in the United States, in the limited context of software licenses, the American Law Institute, 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02(c) (2009) [henceforth ALI Software Contracts Principles] 
have suggested that information disclosure obligations should be imposed on licensors. The merits of this 
approach have been the object of a lively debate, see Robert A. Hillman & Maureen A. O’Rourke, Principles of 
the Law of Software Contracts: Some Highlights, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1519 (2009) (for a general overview of the ALI 
Software Contracts Principles); Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software 
Licensing,  UNIV. CHIC. LAW REV. 95 (2011) (lending support to the approach of the ALI Software Contracts 
Principles); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of the 
ALI’s" Principles of the Law of Software Contracts", UNIV. CHIC. L. REV. 165 (2011) (raising doubts on the 
efficacy of precontractual disclosure in online contacts, and suggesting alternative approaches); Omri Ben-Shahar 
& Carl E. Schneider, The failure of mandated disclosure, UNIV. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (criticizing the efficacy 
of precontractual disclosure); Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen, supra note 43 (suggesting that pre-
contractual disclosures have limited effecacy, based on empirical evidence). See infra part II.C.2. 
49 Generally see FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS, (Rudolph B 
Schlesinger ed., 1968); Franco Ferrari, Formation of Contracts in South American Legal Systems, LOYOLA LOS 
ANGEL. INT. COMP. LAW J. 629 (focusing on South-American jurisdictions); John E. Murray Jr, An Essay on the 
Formation of Contracts and Related Matters under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sales of Goods, 8 JL COM 11 (1988) (for a CISG perspective); Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, 
The Formation of Contracts & (and) the Principles of European Contract Law, 13 PACE INT. L. REV. 371 (2001) 
(exploring contract formation in the PECL); MO ZHANG, CHINESE CONTRACT LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 91–
120 (2005). 
50 See NIMMER AND DODD, supra note 8 at Ch 3 (for United States law); Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 
(for a comparative study of copyright laws in Europe). 
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In this brief contribution, it is not possible to conduct an exhaustive inquiry into all facets of 
the formation of IP license contracts that Member States could explore. The following analysis 
will concentrate on two topics: consent in standard form IP license agreements and form 
requirements. The former involves exploring a thorny intersection between IP law and contract 
law, and affords the opportunity to revisit a well-trodden issue with fresh eyes. By contrast, 
form requirements present legislative policy challenges in the broader context of international 
harmonization.  
1. Consent: standard form IP contracts  
Consent51 lies at the heart of modern contract law theory.52 In the eyes of the law, an agreement 
is binding only if the parties have assented53 to its terms and thus their minds are ad idem. 
Private law establishes the criteria pursuant to which the presence of consent is ascertained.54 
Historically, IP law has not sought to depart from these general rules.  
Over the course of the 20th century, standard form contracts have permeated almost every facet 
of commerce.55 In the realm of IP, this trend has been especially apparent in the technology 
sector.56 Among legal scholars, one long-held thesis contends that standard form contracts sit 
                                                 
51 Since the times of Aristotle, consent is seen as a combination of knowledge and reasonable alternatives see 
KENNETH A. TELFORD, COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS III, 1 (2013). 
52 Despite growing in importance in the late empire, consent was not at the heart Roman contract law; see 
REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 560–
565 (1990) (observing, however, that most “individual parts” of modern contract law theory were present in the 
Corpus Juris Civilis); DAVID J. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 7–10, 71–
76, 130–135 (2001). The idea of consent as the cardinal element of a contract flourished with natural lawyers, see 
Samuel Pufendorf, On the general duties of humanity, III in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF SAMUEL PUFENDORF , 
166 (Craig L. Carr ed., Michael J. Seidler tran., 1994) (“But the things which I owe another from pacts and 
agreements, these I owe for the reason that he has acquired a new right against me from my own consent.”); JEAN 
DOMAT, LES LOIX CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL; LE DROIT PUBLIC, ET LEGUM DELECTUS, livre preliminaire, 
introduction (1777); POTHIER, supra note 2 at 17. On consent in modern contract law theory, see generally AW 
Brian Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth-Century Contract Law, 91 LAW Q. REV. 247 (1975) (detailing the 
historical evolution of consent in English law during the 19th century); PATRICK S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, 
AND LAW (1981) (for a modern English law perspective); JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF 
MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1993) (for a philosophical analysis); Joseph M. Perillo, The origins of the 
objective theory of contract formation and interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (2000) (providing the 
biography of this notion in United States contract law); Brian Bix, Contracts,  in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT 251 
(Franklin Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010). 
53 The words “consent” and “assent” are used synonymously throughout this paragraph. 
54 For a comparative overview of both common and civil law jurisdictions see FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A 
STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 50. For an overview of the approaches to 
ascertaining consent in European civil law jurisdictions see D.C.F.R, supra note 40 at Art II. – 4:102; Timothy 
A.O. Endicott, Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Incomplete Agreements, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 151–
171 (2000) (for an English law perspective); Perillo, supra note 52 (for the United States perspective).   
55 The body of scholarship on standard form contracts is vast. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, What price 
contract? An essay in perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931); Otto Prausnitz, Standardization Of Commercial 
Conttracts In English And Continental Law, (1937); Heinz Hildebrandt, Das Recht der allgemeinen 
Geschäftsbedingungen, 143 ARCH. FÜR CIVILISTISCHE PRAX. 326 (1937); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of 
Adhesion–Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts 
of adhesion: An essay in reconstruction, 96 HARV. LAW REV. 1173 (1983). For a European perspective STANDARD 
CONTRACT TERMS IN EUROPE: A BASIS FOR AND A CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, (Hugh Collins ed., 
2008) (providing an exhaustive analysis of the European normative landscape). 
56 Focusing specifically on IP standard form contracts, see generally Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. 
Williamson, A brief defense of mass market software license agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUT. TECH LJ 335 
(1996); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-form contracting in the electronic age, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 429 (2002); Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743 (2002); Elizabeth 
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uneasily with the consent paradigm as formulated by classical contract law theory.57 This 
submission has its roots in the empirical observation that offerees generally do not read the 
terms of standard form contracts and offerors do not expect them to do so.58 From this premise, 
proponents of this view posit that offerees cannot be held to have consented to undertakings 
the content of which was unknown to them59 and conclude that standard form contracts are 
unenforceable.60 
Though lingering notes of discontent have continued to chime,61 the largely prevailing stance 
among courts and commentators internationally is that standard form contracts are binding.62 
Two submissions are advanced in support of this conclusion. The first is that offerees who 
“manifest” their assent to be legally bound by the terms of a standard form contract are deemed 
to have consented from an objective perspective, even if they failed to read them in fact.63 The 
second submission is that offerees who accept a standard form contract are deemed to have 
given “a blanket assent … to any not unreasonable or indecent terms … which do not alter or 
eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.”64  
This debate has resurfaced with renewed fervor in respect of IP licenses, owing to the 
widespread use of “shrinkwrap” “clickwrap” and “browsewrap” standard forms for these 
agreements (henceforth: Wrap Licenses).65 Legal scholars have emphasized that the 
                                                 
MacDonald, Incorporation of Terms in Website Contracting – Clicking ‘I Agree,’ 27 J. CONTRACT LAW 198 
(2011). 
57 See seminally Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 
833 (1964) (who imported into American scholarship both the qualified “adhesion” and the notion that these 
contracts require special rules of interpretation owing to their perculiar formation process); Kessler, supra note 
56 (denouncing form contracts as affording private parties de facto law-making powers and warning that American 
contract law lacked the doctrinal tools to regulate them). 
58 Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 143–147 (1970); Andrew Robertson, The limits 
of voluntariness in contract, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 179 (2005) (basing this observation on an empirical assessment). 
59 This argument bears the influence of subject consent theory; see Perillo, supra note 52 at 429–432; Randy E. 
Barnett, Consenting to form contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 629–630 (2002). 
60 For a detailed explanation of this argument see Barnett, supra note 59 at 628–629; Perillo, supra note 52. 
61 An example is found in Rakoff, supra note 58 (highlighting that conceptual infrastructure of general contract 
law struggles to accommodate comfortably the realities of standard form contracts). 
62 For a United States perspective see W. David Slawson, The new meaning of contract: the transformation of 
contracts law by standard forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 31–44 (1984) (detailing the different scholarly views 
and judicial approaches emerged during the twentieth-century); Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of 
Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1264, 1274–81 
(1992) (schematically reviewing the different theories on standard form contracts advanced during the twentieth-
century scholars, including those of Edwin Patterson, Friedrich Kessler, William Prosser, Arthur Corbin, Karl 
Llewellyn, Todd Rakoff, Colin Kaufman, Arthur Leff, David Slawson, and Robert Keeton).For a European 
perspective see generally STANDARD CONTRACT TERMS IN EUROPE, supra note 55. For a Chinese perspective see 
Nicole Kornet, Contracting in China: Comparative Observations on Freedom of Contract, Contract Formation, 
Battle of Forms and Standard Form Contracts, 14 ELECTRON. J. COMP. LAW 1, 24–27 (2010). 
63 See Barnett, supra note 59 at 634–636; Bix, supra note 52 at 264–265. Seminally on the notion of “manifest” 
consent JUDAH PHILIP BENJAMIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY: WITH REFERENCE 
TO THE FRENCH CODE AND CIVIL LAW 357–358 (1868). 
64 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960); Karl N Llewellyn, Book 
Review: Prausnitz: The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and Continental Law, 52 HARV. L. 
REV. 700–5 (1939); Colin K. Kaufman, The Resurrection of Contract, 17 WASHBURN LJ 38, 70–72 (1977) 
(supporting Llewellyn’s submission and exploring its corollaries). 
65 There is no longer reason to treat these three contracts as distinct archetypes, as in current online practice they 
have become a single model; see Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke to Internet 
Privacy: The Past, Present, and Future of the Law of Electronic Contracting, 72 MD L. REV 452 (2012) (who 
cogently argue that differences between these types of licenses have disappeared). For a thorough analysis of 
Wrap Licenses see Michelle Garcia, Browsewrap: A Unique Solution to the Slippery Slope of the Clickwrap 
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idiosyncratic formation process of Wrap Licenses greatly magnifies the consent dilemma 
afflicting traditional standard form contracts.66 Moreover, they observe that the terms of these 
agreements are especially problematic, as they confer far-reaching rights to the offeror that are 
often entirely unanticipated by the offeree and raise grave systemic concerns.67 These scholars 
question whether traditional theses designed for paper standard form contracts can be adapted 
to accommodate Wrap licenses adequately; nevertheless, they ultimately agree that the 
presence of consent in these agreements cannot be called into question.68 Despite this, 
proponents of this view strongly advocate the introduction of special rules either regulating 
pre-contractual negotiations preceding these contracts or their substance, especially if 
consumers are involved.69  
The law governing Wrap Licenses is in a state of flux across jurisdictions. In some, courts do 
not admit challenges to their enforceability based on a lack of consent, only timidly 
contemplating the possibility of invalidating individual terms, based on doctrines governing 
substantive fairness.70 In others, Wrap Licenses can be successfully challenged judicially for 
lack of consent and the substance of the stipulations therein can be questioned penetratingly.71 
                                                 
Conundrum, 36 CAMPBELL LAW REV. 31, 34–54 (2014); Elizabeth Macdonald, When is a contract formed by the 
browse-wrap process?, 19 INT. J. LAW INF. TECHNOL. 285 (2011) (for an English law perspective on the formation 
of these contracts); Hillman and Rachlinski, supra note 56 (describing the peculiarities of Wrap Licenses and 
concluding that Llewellyn’s thesis adequately accommodates with minor adjustments); NANCY S. KIM, WRAP 
CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (2013) (providing a systematic account of this topic). 
66 See generally Batya Goodman, Honey, I shrink-wrapped the consumer: the shrink-wrap agreement as an 
adhesion contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319 (1999) (ultimately holding that shrinkwrap licenses are adequately 
governed by the framework for contracts of adhesion); Richard H. Stern, Shrink-wrap licenses of mass marketed 
software: enforceable contracts or whistling in the dark, 11 RUTGERS COMPUT. TECH LJ 51 (1985) (describing as 
“unsettling” the notion that opening a package manifest consent to terms inside of it); Katy Hull, The Overlooked 
Concern with the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 51 HASTINGS LJ 1391 (1999) (emphasizing 
how all these contract forms place offerees in a “take-it-or-leave-it” predicament); KIM, supra note 66 at 35–87 
(providing an extensive account of the history and development of these licenses); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual 
property and shrinkwrap licenses, 68 CAL L. REV. 1239 (1994) (providing a map of the conceptual problems 
raised by these licenses). For a European perspective see N. Helberger et al., Digital Content Contracts for 
Consumers, 36 J. CONSUM. POLICY 37 (2013); Lucie Guibault, Copyright limitations and contracts: are click-
wrap licenses valid? 2 Journal of Digital Property Law 144 (2002). 
67 See KIM, supra note 65 at 44–53; Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in electronic contracting: minimum standards for 
non-negotiated contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041 (2005) (suggesting that the doctrine of unconscionability is not 
adequate to redress these imbalances); Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just one click: The reality of 
internet retail contracting, COLUM. L. REV. 984 (2008) (offering an empirical analysis of such terms); Robert W. 
Gomulkiewicz, Getting serious about user-friendly mass market licensing for Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. 
REV.687 (2003) (articulating steps that might render these contracts more user friendly). 
68 For a comprehensive analysis of the case law in the United States see NIMMER AND DODD, supra note 8 §§ 
3:32-3:34. 
69 See supra note 47 on the pre-contractual disclosure for digital, standard form IP licenses; on substantive controls 
on the terms of IP licenses see infra Part II.D. 
70 Following initial uncertainties, this is the position in the United States, see NIMMER AND DODD, supra note 8 § 
3:33 (providing a detailed analysis of the relevant judicial authorities). 
71 For a comparative analysis see Jane K. Winn & Brian H. Bix, Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting 
in the US and EU, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175 (2006) (comparing the normative approaches in the United States 
and EU); James R. Maxeiner, Standard Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives,  
YALE J. INT. L. 109 (2003) (comparing Germany, the EU and the United States); F. Wang, The incorporation of 
terms into commercial contracts: A reassessment in the digital age,  J. BUS. LAW 87 (2015) (comparing European 
Union, UK and Chinese law); Hasan A. Deveci, Consent in online contracts: old wine in new bottles, COMPUT. 
TELECOMMUN. L. REV. 223 (2007) (focusing primarily on English law); Phillip Johnson, All wrapped up? A 
review of the enforceability of ‘Shrink-wrap’and ‘Click-wrap’licenses in the United Kingdom and the United 
States, 25 EUR. INTELLECT. PROP. REV. 98 (2003) (focusing specifically on the enfroceability of these contracts 
and comparing the United States and the United Kingdom); Roberto Rosas, Comparative study of the formation 
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The resulting international legal framework for these IP licenses is piecemeal and riddled with 
uncertainty. This is particularly problematic at a time when standard form terms are offered to 
a global audience of potential licensees over the internet at an ever-accelerating pace and in an 
increasing number of sectors.  
The Project might consider addressing this contentious matter. It is submitted that it would be 
for Member States to initially agree whether standard form IP licenses are capable of being 
vitiated by a lack of consent that undermines their enforceability. If such a concern were 
unanimously shared by Member States, the circumstances in which acceptance of a standard 
form IP license gives rise to concerns regarding the consent of the licensee would have to be 
defined precisely; for example, it could be agreed that this is only the case if the license is 
entered into remotely and a consumer were involved. The final step would be for Member 
States to elaborate substantive rules to address the aforementioned deficit of consent.  
Notably, the scope of the Project would once more be of decisive importance in shaping this 
discussion. Though imperfect assent beleaguers Wrap licenses generally, the intensity of this 
issue varies markedly depending on the subjects involved in the transaction and the type of IP 
licensed.   
2. Form requirements 
Private law establishes tenets that govern form requirements for all contracts.72 IP law 
commonly provides supplementary rules for assignments, licenses and other contractual 
dealings.  
The intersection of these two normative streams produces a markedly different landscape 
across jurisdictions.73 In some, strict and onerous formalities are required: IP contracts are void 
unless in writing and signed.74 In others, form requirements are entirely absent.75 In others still, 
formalities are only required ad probationem.76 License agreements for different IP rights are 
                                                 
of electronic contracts in American law with references to international law, COMPUT. TELECOMMUN. LAW REV. 
4 (2007) (for a broad comparative assessment of the formation of electronic contracts). 
72 Form requirements were paramount in ancient legal cultures and Roman law, see ZIMMERMANN, supra note 52 
at 546–549. Over the centuries, however, mandatory formalities have become exceptional in nature, yielding to 
the principle that parties are free to choose the expression they prefer for their agreement. For a primer on form 
requirements in European contract law see D.C.F.R, supra note 40 at Art II. – 4:101 (as a general rule there are 
no form requirements, yet most jurisdictions contemplate exceptions for special contracts). For an Anglo-
American perspective, see generally Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and 
Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39 (1974); Eric Posner, The decline of formality in contract law, in 
THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 61–77 (Frank Buckley ed., 1999); Patrick S. Atiyah & Robert S. 
Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law a Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, 
and Legal Institutions, (1987). 
73 See generally Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 § 3.3 (providing an overview of the European landscape); 
NIMMER AND DODD, supra note 8 §§ 3:44-3:49 (offering a primer of the law in the United States). 
74 For example, this is the case in the United Kingdom for patent (section 30 UK PA), trademarks (section 28 
United Kingdom Trade Marks Act 1994) [henceforth UK TMA], and copyright licenses (sections 92, 101A 
CDPA). The same is true in Spain for patent article 74 Ley N° 24/2015, de 24 de julio, de Patentes [henceforth 
Spanish Patent law], and article 46 of Ley Nº 17/2001, de 7 de diciembre de 2001, de Marcas [henceforth Spanish 
Trademarks law]; notably, registration in the patent registered is contingent on the license being in the form of a 
deed under article 74 Spanish Patent law. 
75 This is the case in Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden; see Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 § 4.1.3. 
76 For example, this is the case in Belgium (Article XI.167 Belgian Code of Economic Law), Italy (article 110 
Italian Copyright Law) and Luxembourg (Article 12 Loi du 18 avril 2001 sur les droits d'auteur, les droits voisins 
et les bases de données) [henceforth Luxembourg Copyright and Related Rights Act] 
 
Accepted for publication in the (2018) 86 University of Cincinnati Law Review
17 
 
often subject to contrasting form requirements within the same jurisdiction.77 Additionally, a 
veritable cacophony of rules, regulations and standards surround electronic documents and 
signatures.78 
This cacophony can be explained by the profoundly conflicting attitudes that exist towards 
form requirements internationally, both in contract law and IP law. Regardless, legal scholars 
have been unequivocal in denouncing the extant legal framework for its high transactional costs 
and legal uncertainty.79 
The Project should consider recommending a uniform legal regime for the form requirements 
for IP license agreements, to promote international harmonization. Member States would 
undertake to seek equilibrium between two polarized impulses. At one extreme, the impetus to 
expedite contract formation and reduce transaction costs by minimizing form requirements. At 
the other, the desire to increase legal certainty and foster transparency by imposing formalities 
that require extensive disclosure of sensitive information.  
It is submitted that this balancing assessment and ensuing policy decision would be best 
informed by a comparative appraisal of the current state of the law across multiple jurisdictions 
and empirical data collected from stakeholders. Notably, the scale and complexity of this 
inquiry would differ substantially depending on the scope of the Project.  
D. Content: rights and obligations of the licensor and licensee 
It is a widely-accepted principle that persons can freely decide whether to enter into a contract, 
with whom and under which terms.80 Nevertheless, the content of the synallagmatic nexus 
agreed by the parties does not exist in a vacuum but is rather affected by two distinct categories 
of legal rules.81   
                                                 
77 For example, in the United States exclusive licenses must be in writing, while non-exclusive licenses do not; 
see generally NIMMER AND NIMMER, supra note 32 § 10.03; NIMMER AND DODD, supra note 8 §§ 3:44-3:49, 5:59; 
it should be noted however that written form is relevant for non-exclusive copyright licenses to resolve priority 
disputes under 17 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2010). In the Netherlands copyright licenses need not be in writing, while a 
written instrument is required for a license of neighboring rights (article 9 of the Act of March 18, 1993, containing 
Rules on the Protection of Performers, Phonogram Producers and Broadcasting Organizations and Amending the 
Copyright Act 1912) [henceforth Dutch Neighboring Right Act]. In France articles L131-2, L-132-7, L212-3 Code 
de la propriété intellectuelle (version consolidée au 17 mars 2017) [henceforth French Intellectual Property Code] 
establish variable set of formalities for copyright related contracts. See generally Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra 
note 9 §§ 4.2.3, 4.3.3.  
78 This an area in which the United States benefits from a degree of clarity from The Electronic Signatures in 
Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign) 15 U.S.C. 96; on this statute see generally Robert A. Wittie & Jane 
K. Winn, Electronic Records and Signatures under the Federal E-SIGN Legislation and the UETA, BUS. LAWYER 
293 (2000) (providing an analysis of this statutory instrument). Across the world, however, there is substantial 
disharmony. See generally Donnie L. Kidd Jr & William H. Daughtrey Jr, Adapting contract law to accommodate 
electronic contracts: Overview and suggestions, 26 RUTGERS COMPUT. TECH L.J. 215 (1999) (suggesting that 
often adapting existing contract law doctrines is sufficient to accommodate the needs of electronic transactions). 
79 See Brennan and Dodd, supra note 15 at 258, 264. 
80 See generally PATRICK SELIM ATIYAH, 1 THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); MICHAEL J. 
TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1997). 
81 See generally Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and paternalist motives in contract and tort law, with special 
reference to compulsory terms and unequal bargaining power, 41 MD. L. REV.563 (1981) (discussing how the 
dividing line between mandatory and default rules might, in practice, become blurred). 
 
Accepted for publication in the (2018) 86 University of Cincinnati Law Review
18 
 
The first are mandatory82 rules (henceforth MRs). MRs curtail party autonomy by imposing 
non-derogable rights and obligations on contracting parties;83 they are typically either 
prescriptive or proscriptive in nature.84 The second category consists of default85 rules 
(henceforth DRs). DRs establish rights and obligations that apply to the contracting parties 
only in so far as they have not agreed otherwise; the defining feature of these rules is that they 
are presumptive.86 Both MRs and DRs can originate from many branches of the law and express 
a broad range of policy concerns; some apply to all contracts homogenously, while others only 
extend to contracts with determinate features.87 
Parties who stipulate IP licenses are subject to MRs and DRs that apply to all binding pacts 
generally. Their agreement is also influenced by MRs and DRs specific to these contracts; the 
latter group of rules stems primarily from IP laws, yet can also emerge from other branches of 
the law such as competition law and consumer law. A comparative analysis of the rules 
impacting the content of IP licenses reveals marked differences in their prevalence, substance 
and intensity across jurisdictions. Notably, disharmony is most pronounced in relation to 
copyright licenses.88 
With regard to MRs, some jurisdictions establish a thicket of rules that severely limit the 
freedom of the parties to architect their own agreement. Others contemplate but few MRs of 
proscriptive nature, allowing ample space for the parties’ contractual creativity. These 
conflicting approaches are an external manifestation of the degree of proclivity of the legal 
order in question to encroach on private transactions and, more generally, the value attributed 
to freedom of contract. By contrast, across jurisdictions there is a relative paucity of DRs 
specifically addressing IP licenses; when they are present, they tend to address matters of 
secondary importance. Notable in its absence is a discernible systemic approach.89  
                                                 
82 These are sometimes alternatively referred to as “immutable” or “coercive”.  
83 In this paragraph, the expression “freedom of contract” and “party autonomy” are used as synonymy.  
84 See Kennedy, supra note 81 at 595–596; Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal restrictions on private 
contracts can enhance efficiency, 6 J. LAW ECON. ORGAN. 381 (1990) (arguing that certain mandatory rules can 
enhance efficiency). 
85 These are sometimes alternatively referred to as “non-mandatory”, “presumptive” or “terms implied in law”.  
86 The literature on DRs is vast. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling gaps in incomplete contracts: 
An economic theory of default rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88–89 (1989); Richard Craswell, Contract law: General 
theories, 3 ENCYCL. LAW ECON. 1 (2000) (providing an overview of the main theories developed in the 19th 
century on DRs); IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 346–347 (1978); Matthias E. Storme, Freedom of Contract: Mandatory and Non-Mandatory Rules in 
European Contract Law’(2007), 15 EUR. REV. PRIV. LAW 233, 239–251; Robert Grary, The Prescriptive Nature 
of Obligatory Laws, 69 ARSP ARCH. FÜR RECHTS-SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE ARCH. PHILOS. LAW SOC. PHILOS. 311 
(1983) (analyzing Hart’s, Augustine’s and Kelsen’s conception of mandatory rules). 
87 For a systemic map of mandatory rules Storme, supra note 86 at 239–247; for a systemic European perspective 
see Martijn W. Hesselink, Non-Mandatory Rules in European Contract Law, 1 EUR. REV. CONTRACT LAW 44 
(2005). 
88 For an exhaustive analysis of this topic see Paul Katzenberger, Protection of the author as the weaker party to 
a contract under international copyright contract law, 19 IIC 731 (1988); for a comparative analysis between the 
United States and select law jurisdictions see Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of 
Author Autonomoy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS ENT LJ 1 (1994).  
89 In the United States, the most notable attempts fill this lacuna are Uniform Computer Information Transactions 
Act (UCITA) and the ALI Software Contract Principles. On UCITA and its troubled history see generally Amelia 
H. Boss, Taking UCITA on the Road: What Lessons Have We Learned Symposium - Information and Electronic 
Commerce Law: Comparative Perspectives, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIV. L. REV. 167 (2001); Nim Razook, The 
Politics and Promise of UCITA Legal Issues Facing Corporations, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 643 (2002). On the 
ALI Software Contract Principles see generally Hillman and O’Rourke, supra note 49; Juliet M. Moringello & 
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It is almost a foregone conclusion that Member States would devote significant attention to the 
consideration of possible MRs and DRs that would affect the content of IP license agreements. 
Negotiations would likely be challenging, owing to the substantially different approaches that 
exist at national level. Though MRs and DRs combine to create unitary body of rules, it is 
submitted that Member States would benefit from considering them separately, owing to the 
profound ontological and functional differences that characterize these two categories of rules. 
1. Decision-making process for mandatory rules 
In principle, there are two bases of adoption for a MR: protection of an interest of either one or 
both the contracting parties; and protection of an interest of persons not privy to this contract: 
society at large or a segment thereof. Crucially, the threshold of adoption is high: the interest 
under consideration must be deemed of such systemic importance as to warrant the introduction 
of a non-derogable rule that either restricts or completely precludes the parties’ autonomy to 
dispose of it contractually.  
A cursory comparative analysis reveals that MRs applicable to all contracts typically protect 
general interests such as legality, the integrity of consent, and reliance.90 By contrast, MRs that 
apply to determinate contracts safeguard interests that are vital to their context of application. 
In the realm of copyright, MRs that nullify any attempt of an author to assign or license their 
moral rights are a revelatory example of an intervention aimed at protecting an interest deemed 
to be of critical importance.91 
Thus, in developing MRs, it would be for Member States to define first which of the types of 
interests described above the Project should seek to protect when regulating IP license 
contracts, and their respective order of priority. This discussion would involve legal, political, 
social, and economic considerations. It should, however, be shaped by the observation that the 
function of MRs is to protect interests deemed systemically significant rather than reduce minor 
legal or economic inefficiencies. Thereafter, Member States should dissect the structure of IP 
license agreements to ascertain which segments lend themselves to stipulations capable of 
undermining those interests that have been identified as worthy of protection if left entirely to 
unrestricted party autonomy.  
Any excursion that sought to venture beyond methodological observations would be premature 
if conducted prior to deliberations establishing which interests Member States wish to shield 
from absolute freedom of contract, and their respective order of priority. Nevertheless, based 
on a comparative analysis of IP-specific MRs most frequently encountered across jurisdictions, 
it is submitted that the following are examples of types of norms that Member States might 
consider: limitations to the breadth and depth of the license grant that the parties can agree,92 a 
standard of conduct in performance for the rights and obligations stipulated under the IP 
                                                 
William L. Reynolds, What’s Software Got to Do with IT-The ALI Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, 
84 TUL. L. REV. 1541 (2009). 
90 For a detailed analysis see Storme, supra note 86 at 244–251. 
91 For an exhaustive comparative analysis of the different MRs that exist internationally restricting freedom of 
contract in respect of copyright moral rights see PAUL GOLDSTEIN & P. B. HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 345–356 (2010); ELIZABETH ADENEY, THE MORAL RIGHTS OF 
AUTHORS AND PERFORMERS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2006); Henry Hansmann & 
Marina Santilli, Authors’ and artists’ moral rights: A comparative legal and economic analysis, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 
95, 124–130 (1997) (providing a law and economic analysis of the effects of inalienability of moral rights). 
92 For example, in many European jurisdictions, copyright laws contain MRs limiting the licensing of future rights, 
for a comparative analysis see Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9. 
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license,93 a warranty regarding the quality and title of the licensed IP right,94 and restrictions 
on terms the effect of which is to magnify the scope of protection of the licensed IP right beyond 
statutory confines.95 
2. Decision-making process for default rules 
The bases for the adoption of DRs are a highly contentious topic, which has spawned vivacious 
discussions and vast literature. Legal scholars, philosophers and economists are deeply divided 
with regard to the policy aims that should inform these rules.96  
The most widely-supported theory is that DRs should promote economic efficiency; among its 
proponents, however, there is marked disagreement concerning the manner in which these 
norms should achieve this objective.97 Alternative views have been posited, including 
suggestions that DRs should be grounded in the customs, usages and practices of the parties’ 
community (henceforth Conventionalism),98 formalities,99 the consent of the contracting 
parties100 or  morality.101 Recently, two further foundations for DRs have been proposed: the 
history of the legal order in question and its constitution.102  
In light of such profoundly diverging stances, Member States would face a schismatic decision 
in electing the bases of adoption for the DRs to be included in Project. One possibility might 
                                                 
93 For example, many European jurisdictions contain a general MR that applies to all contract, requiring parties 
to perform their contract in good faith; for a comparative European analysis see REINHARD ZIMMERMANN & 
SIMON WHITTAKER, GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (2000) (providing both a theoretical analysis and 
case studies). In similar vein, albeit with substantial differences, the Uniform Commercial Code establishes a duty 
to perform contracts in good faith, see generally Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and 
the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, VA. L. REV. 195 (1968); Atiyah and Summers, supra note 
72; Steven J. Burton, Breach of contract and the common law duty to perform in good faith, HARV. L. REV. 369 
(1980); Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1981). Notably, the ALI Principles of Software Contracts chose to retain the general 
UCC obligation to perform contractual obligations in good faith; for commentary see Hillman and O’Rourke, 
supra note 48 at 1533–1534 (providing an overview of this issue). 
94 For example, see ALI Software Contracts Principles § 3.05b; for a detailed commentary Hillman and O’Rourke, 
supra note 49 at 1534–1535; NIMMER AND DODD, supra note 8 §§ 8:5-8:30. 
95 See generally, Robert A. Hillman, Contract Law in Context: The Case of Software Contracts, 45 WAKE FOR. 
L. REV. 669, 674–676 (2010); NIMMER AND DODD, supra note 8 §§ 13:24-13:33 (providing an exhaustive analysis 
of the law in the United States). 
96 The bibliography on this topic is vast. See generally Ayres and Gertner, supra note 86 (arguing that in specific 
situations, it is efficient to impose a penalty default rule to discourage strategic information withholding); Eric A. 
Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA ST UL REV. 563 (2005) (arguing that penalty 
default rules don’t exist). 
97 For an overview of the theories that have been advanced over the course of time see Craswell, supra note 86 § 
3; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 434 (1992) (for an explanation of the ‘Majoritarian’ or 
‘Market-Mimicking’ thesis); Ayres and Gertner, supra note 86 (for the ‘Information-Forcing’ or ‘Penalty’ Default 
Rules thesis). 
98 See MACNEIL, supra note 86 at 854–905; Ian R. Macneil, Economic analysis of contractual relations: its 
shortfalls and the need for a rich classificatory apparatus, 75 NW UL REV. 1018, 1018–1063 (1980); Randy E. 
Barnett, The sound of silence: default rules and contractual consent, VA. L. REV. 821 (1992); Steven J. Burton, 
Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 115 (1993). 
99 See generally Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and form, 41 COLUMBIA L. REV. 799 (1941) (suggesting that default 
rules should induce parties to express their intentions in a manner that could be recognized by courts easily). 
100 For an explanation of this thesis and a cogent critique, see Christopher A. Riley, Designing default rules in 
contract law: Consent, conventionalism, and efficiency, 20 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 367, 370–375 (2000). 
101 See Burton, supra note 98 (default rules should be based on the coordinating principle of fairness). For a 
comprehensive bibliography see Craswell, supra note 86 § 12. 
102 See Hesselink, supra note 87 at 62–65. 
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be to embrace one of the aforementioned theories. In principle, such a choice would be elegant 
and offer consistency; in practice, it would be both politically and substantively problematic to 
realize, as reaching a consensus on the principle to be followed would be wearying. 
Alternatively, Member States could opt for an “eclectic” method that takes into account 
multiple bases concurrently.103 This strategy would make allowances for a range of views and 
sensitivities, though it would saddle Member States with the heavy burden of formulating an 
order of priority among the chosen principles. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the intergovernmental and international nature of the 
Project would intrinsically simplify this decision-making process. In the ambit of negotiations 
involving a large number of sovereign entities with profoundly different histories, social norms 
and traditions, striving to ground DRs in historical, constitutional or moral considerations 
would be unrealistic. Accordingly, the most viable bases of adoption to be considered by 
Member States would be economic efficiency and Conventionalism. 
E. Canons104 of interpretation105 
In every legal system, private law establishes principles and rules of construction that apply to 
all contracts in every legal system.106 In many jurisdictions, IP law provides ulterior 
hermeneutical canons that address idiosyncratic aspects of assignments and license 
agreements. 
The ubiquitously-recognized aim of contract construction is to establish the intention of the 
parties.107 Despite this, there is imperfect alignment between the rules, principles and processes 
that jurisdictions apply in pursuit of this core objective. Inter alia, the extent to which the 
common intention of the parties is construed subjectively or objectively varies significantly,108 
                                                 
103 See Riley, supra note 91 at 389–390; Hesselink, supra note 87 at 69. 
104 The words canon is used here to include both rules and principles of interpretation. 
105 For present purposes, the words construction and interpretation are used as synonymy. The terminological 
convention according to which “interpretation” designates the operation to discern meaning, while “construction” 
identifies process to establish legal effects is not accepted in this paper; see The Restatement Second of Contracts 
para 200. 
106 The body of scholarship on this topic is vast. For a United States perspective see generally Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, The theory of legal interpretation, HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899); Patterson, supra note 57; EDWARD ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, 2 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS (3 ed. 2004)§ 7.8; STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT 
INTERPRETATION (2009); for a recent reconceptualisation of contract interpretation see Alan Schwartz & Robert 
E. Scott, Contract theory and the limits of contract law,  YALE L.J. 541 (2003); for a critical analysis of this new 
thesis Steven J. Burton, A Lesson on Some Limits of Economic Analysis: Schwartz and Scott on Contract 
Interpretation, 88 INDIANA L. J. 339 (2013) (also providing a detailed account of the different views expressed by 
commentators). In England see GERARD MCMEEL, THE CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS: INTERPRETATION, 
IMPLICATION AND RECTIFICATION (2007); KIM LEWISON, THE INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS (2015). For 
European civil law perspective see HUGH BEALE ET AL., CONTRACT LAW: IUS COMMUNE CASEBOOKS FOR THE 
COMMON LAW OF EUROPE 13 (2010); GRZEGORZ ZMIJ & BETTINA HEIDERHOFF, INTERPRETATION IN POLISH, 
GERMAN AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (2011). For a comparative analysis see Stefan Vogenauer, Andrew 
Burrows & Edwin Peel, Interpretation of Contracts. Concluding Comparative Observations, in CONTRACT TERMS 
123–152 (2007). 
107 Generally, see E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1967); ALFRED 
THOMPSON DENNING BARON DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW 32–50 (1979). in the United States see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 (1981); for a European perspective see D.C.F.R, supra note 40 at 
II. – 8:101 (providing a primer of the canons of interpretation in European jurisdictions). 
108 See Vogenauer, Burrows, and Peel, supra note 106 at 124–128 (explaining the underlying theoretical 
differences and comparing the law in England, France and Germany); D.C.F.R, supra note 40 at II-8:101 (for a 
primer of the different hermeneutical matter in European jurisdictions); Perillo, supra note 52 (explaining the 
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as do the precepts guiding completive interpretation109 and recourse to good faith as a 
hermeneutical device.110 Even where jurisdictions share common principles and rules of 
construction, their method of application differs.111 Moreover, while interpretation is a matter 
of law in some legal orders, it is one of fact in others.112 
IP law canons of construction for license agreements are supplementary in nature, as they 
complement the general rules and principles laid out by contract law.113 Notably, their scope 
of application varies. Some apply horizontally to licenses regardless of the type of IP involved. 
For example, there are jurisdictions where a principle has emerged which suggests that both 
ambiguous and unclear terms in such contracts should be interpreted in favor of the licensor.114  
By contrast, in most jurisdictions, the substantial majority of established IP canons of 
construction have a narrower scope, confined to agreements that involve a particular form of 
IP. This is especially apparent in the realm of copyright. For example, in France,115 Belgium,116 
                                                 
trajectory of objective interpretation in United States contract law); David McLauchlan, Common Assumptions 
and Contract Interpretation’ (1997), 113 LAW Q. REV. 237. 
109 Vogenauer, Burrows, and Peel, supra note 106 at 130–132; E. Allan Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in 
Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 860 (1968); D.C.F.R, supra note 40 at II. – 9:101 (for a primer of the law in 
European jurisdictions); Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 
CORNELL REV.785 (1981). 
110 On good faith as an interpretation prism, see classically FRANZ WIEACKER, ZUR RECHTSTHEORETISCHEN 
PRÄZISIERUNG DES §§ 242 BGB (1956) (who drew an analogy with Papinianus’ conception of the ius honorarium 
(or ius praetorium) as adiuvandi vel supplendi vel corrigendi iuris civilis). For European perspective see Reinhard 
Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker, Good faith in European contract law surveying the legal landscape, in GOOD 
FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 1-25 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker eds. 2000); Martijn 
Hesselink, The Concept of Good Faith, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 619 (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds. 
4th edn, 2010). For an EU perspective NORBERT REICH, General principles of EU civil law 189-213 (2013). For 
the United States law perspective Summers, supra note 93; Burton, supra note 93. In the context of the CISG see 
Paul J. Powers, Defining the undefinable: Good faith and the United Nations Convention on the contracts for the 
international sale of goods, 18 JL COM 333 (1998); Alexander S. Komarov, Internationality, Uniformity and 
Observance of Good Faith as Criteria in Interpretation of CISG: Some Remarks on Article 7 (1), 25 JL COM 75 
(2005); Nathalie Hofmann, Interpretation Rules and Good Faith as Obstacles to the UK’s Ratification of the CISG 
and to the Harmonization of Contract Law in Europe, 22 PACE INTL REV.145 (2010). In the ambit of the Principles 
of European Contract Law see Ole Lando, Is Good Faith an Over-Arching General Clause in the Principles of 
European Contract Law, 15 EUR REV.PRIV. L 841 (2007). 
111 See Vogenauer, Burrows, and Peel, supra note 106 at 129–136; BURTON, supra note 97 at 1. 
112 For a thorough explanation of this topic and a comparative analysis across jurisdictions see Vogenauer, 
Burrows, and Peel, supra note 106 at 129–130; D.C.F.R, supra note 40 at II-8:101 (providing a comparative 
overview of European jurisdictions). 
113 In the United States, alongside contract law principles of individual states, the Uniform Commercial Code 
Article 2 has also influenced the interpretation of IP licenses; see GOMULKIEWICZ, supra note 9 at 5–6; NIMMER 
AND DODD, supra note 8 § 4:2. 
114 Notably, in the United States, contract law of individual states typically holds that ambiguous terms must be 
construed contra proferentem; see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1981). However, this canon is often 
disregarded in IP licenses following the principle that such stipulations should be construed in favour of the 
licensor, see GOMULKIEWICZ, supra note 9 at 12–13 analysing this principle of construction and the relevant case 
law. 
115 Article L122-7(4) French Intellectual Property Code; notably, the Cour de Cassation Cass. 1re.civ., 30 Sept. 
2010, CCE, 2010, comm: 199, held that this interpretation rule is non-derogable for the parties. 
116 Article XI.167 Code de droit économique (version consolidée de 2016) [henceforth Belgian Code of Economic 
Law].  
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Luxemburg117 and Spain,118 ambiguous terms must be interpreted in favor of the author (in 
dubio pro autore).119 In France,120 Belgium121 and, to a lesser degree, the United States122 the 
scope of copyright licenses is interpreted strictly and limited to the rights expressly mentioned 
in the agreement. Germany,123 Greece124 and Italy125 have established a construction rule 
according to which the scope of copyright licenses must be determined in light of the purpose 
of the transaction.126 In Hungary,127 licenses to produce a copyright-protected work are 
construed generously to include permission to distribute copies if stipulations on this matter 
are unclear. Conversely, there are also jurisdictions in which no such special canons of 
construction have emerged for IP license contracts and general contract law principles and rules 
of construction apply almost unwaveringly.128  
Thus, the legal framework governing the interpretation of IP license agreements displays a 
distinct lack of uniformity at an international level. To some extent, this can be overcome by 
way of dexterous drafting and by taking advantage of choice of law rules, yet this can be a 
source of costly uncertainty. 
The Project may consider exploring this nuanced facet of the legal framework governing IP 
licenses. It would be for Member States to develop bespoke hermeneutical rules and principles 
                                                 
117 Article 12 Luxembourg Copyright and Related Rights Act. 
118 Articles 43, 76 Texto refundido de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual, regularizando, aclarando y armonizando 
las Disposiciones Legales Vigentes sobre la Materia (aprobado por el Real Decreto legislativo Nº 1/1996 de 12 
de abril, y modificado hasta la Ley N° 12/2017, de 3 de julio de 2017) [henceforth Spanish Copyright Law]. 
119 On this principle of interpretation, see generally Strowel and Vanbrabant, supra note 9 at 40; Guibault and 
Hugenholtz, supra note 9 §§ 4.2.6, 4.3.6, 4.7.6 for a detailed analysis in France, Belgium and Spain respectively. 
120 Article L122-7(4) Code de la propriété intellectuelle (version consolidée au 17 mars 2017) [henceforth French 
Intellectual Property Code]; notably, the Cour de Cassation Cass. 1re.civ., 30 Sept. 2010, CCE, 2010, comm: 199, 
held that this interpretation rule is non-derogable for the parties 
121 Article XI.167 Belgian Code of Economic Law; see generally Alain Strowel, Belgium, 1 in INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (Melville B. Nimmer & Paul E. Geller eds., 1999). 
122 This canon of construction stems from 17 USC § 201(d)(2) (1978). Ginsburg, supra note 6. However, 
commentators have observed that United States courts have not always adopted a consistent approach to the 
interpretation of the scope of copyright licenses; see generally Stacey M. Byrnes, Copyright Licenses, New Technology 
and Default Rules: Converging Media, Diverging Courts, 20 LOY ENT REV.243 (2000) (suggesting that there are no 
clearly affirmed rules of construction followed consistently).  
123 See § 31 (5) German Copyright Act. For an explanation in English of the Zweckübertragungstheorie, see 
Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 § 4.4.6; in German see generally STEFAN SCHWEYER, DIE 
ZWECKÜBERTRAGUNGSTHEORIE IM URHEBERRECHT (1982). 
124 Articles 15(4), 34(1)-(2) Law No. 2121/1993 on Copyright, Related Rights and Cultural Matters (as amended 
up to Law No. 4281/2014) [henceforth Greek the Copyright Law]; generally see LAMBROS E. KOTSIRIS, GREEK 
COPYRIGHT LAW (2012); Dionysia Kallinikou, License Contracts, Free Software and Creative Commons in 
Greece,  in FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE (FOSS) AND OTHER ALTERNATIVE LICENSE MODELS 227–234 
(Axel Metzeger ed., 2016); GEŌRGIOS KOUMANTOS & IRINI A. STAMATOUDI, GREEK COPYRIGHT LAW (2014). 
125 See article 119 Italian Copyright Law; in depth, see ALESSANDRO COGO, I CONTRATTI DI DIRITTO D’AUTORE 
NELL’ERA DIGITALE 200-220 (2010). 
126 According to Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 §§4.1.6, 4.7.6. this principle of construction appears to 
also be judicially accepted in Austria, see OGH, 21 March 2000 (Für Katalog und Folder), GRUR Int. 2001/2, p. 
186-187. See also: OGH, 23 March 1993 (Corporate Identity Programm), GRUR Int. 1994/08-09, p. 758, and 
Portugal appears to have progressively followed suit. Interestingly, though Dutch law recognises this canon of 
construction for copyright assignment contracts it does not extend it to licenses; see generally Frederik W. 
Grosheide, Dutch Report on individual contracts of authors & performers, 253-281 in ALAI CONFERENCE 1997 
MONTEBELLO, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS COWANSVILLE (QUÉBEC) (Gildas Roussel ed., 1998). 
127 Article 47(4) Act No. LXXVI of 1999 on Copyright (consolidated text of January 1, 2007) [henceforth 
Hungarian Copyright Act]. 
128 See generally Guibault and Hugenholtz, supra note 9 § 4.9.6; COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT, 
supra note 9 §§5-233-5-240.  
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that would be conducive to reconstructing the intention of parties to IP licenses. Regrettably, 
in light of the profoundly diverging national approaches to contract construction generally and 
IP licenses specifically, it is submitted that agreeing both the approach and substance of such 
canons would be challenging. Additionally, Member States would face one particularly 
significant conceptual obstacle: any rule or principle of interpretation developed would need 
to be compatible or at least not at odds with general contract law canons of interpretation from 
across a vast number of jurisdictions.  
Notably, the scope of Project would decisively affect endeavors addressing canons of 
construction for IP licenses. If its remit were broad, Members States would face a uniquely 
demanding challenge, as they would have to elaborate high-level construction principles, 
focusing on the interpretation of the functional core of IP licenses. If the scope of the Project 
were narrow, Member States might encounter fewer difficulties in crafting canons of 
interpretation that methodically target precisely-delimited issues of construction germane to 
the type of license under consideration.  
F. Registration 
Registration systems are a staple of most legal orders. Typically, they record information such 
as the existence of goods deemed to be of elevated socio-economic importance,129 the identity 
of persons, both legal and natural,130 and systemically relevant transactions.131 Their social, 
economic and political purposes132 can be immensely diverse, as can be their legal nature and 
function.133   
                                                 
129 For example, throughout history, ship registration systems have been ubiquitous, owing to their economic, 
commercial and military importance; see ROBERT DAWSON CAMPBELL, THE SHIP’S REGISTER: A HISTORY OF 
BRITISH SHIP STATUS AND REGISTRATION PROCEDURES INCLUDING THEIR ADOPTION IN NEW ZEALAND (1990); 
Ray Bergsma, Shipping Registrations, 3 AUSTL NZ MAR LJ 5 (1985); BENJAMIN WOODS. LABAREE, AMERICA 
AND THE SEA: A MARITIME HISTORY (1998); THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARITIME HISTORY, Registration 
and Documentation of Ships (John J Hattendorf ed., 2007). Historically, registration systems have been 
instrumental to the development of marine insurance, see John H. Baker, The law merchant and the common law 
before 1700, 38 CAMB. L.J. 295 (1979); HOWARD N. BENNETT, THE LAW OF MARINE INSURANCE 1 (2 ed. 2007); 
GUIDO ROSSI, INSURANCE IN ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND: THE LONDON CODE (2016) (for a recent contribution and 
an exhaustive bibliography). Similarly, land registers have existed for time immemorial in numerous legal orders; 
for the history of land registration in England see R. R. A. Walker, The Genesis of Land Registration in England, 
55 LQ REV.547 (1939); L. Pemberton, HM Land Registry: An Historical Perspective, HM LAND REGIST. LOND. 
(1992); STUART J. ANDERSON, LAWYERS AND THE MAKING OF ENGLISH LAND LAW: 1832-1940 (1992). 
130 For natural persons, beyond the obvious example of birth registers, it should be noted that registration systems 
have been instrumental to operating ad hoc legal regimes for special groups of individuals; outlaws registers are 
a pertinent example Ralph B. Pugh, Early Registers of English Outlaws, 27 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 319 (1983); Jane 
Y. Chong, Targeting the Twenty-First-Century Outlaw, 122 YALE L.J. 724, 743–750 (2012) (for a schematic and 
precise historical account). 
131 For example, secured transactions registers, see Giuliano G. Castellano, Reforming Non-Possessory Secured 
Transactions Laws: A New Strategy?, 78 MOD. L. REV. 611 (2015) (for a rich bibliography on secured transactions 
registers, their systemic function and relevance for law reform); Marek Dubovec, UCC Article 9 Registration 
System for Latin America, 28 ARIZ J INTL COMP L 117 (2011) (identifying the cardinal elements of the UCC 9 
registration system). 
132 For a socio-economic analysis of the effect of transaction registers see BENITO ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE: THEORY AND POLICY OF CONTRACTUAL REGISTRIES (2012); Benito 
Arruñada, Registries, 1 MAN ECON. 209 (2014); for the legal function of registers in the property-contract 
dichotomy Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Carmine Guerriero & Zhenxing Huang, The Property–Contract Balance, 
172 J. INSTITUTIONAL THEOR. ECON. JITE 40 (2016); for a systemtic study of land registration systems see JAAP 
ZEVENBERGEN, SYSTEMS OF LAND REGISTRATION ASPECTS AND EFFECTS (2002). 
133 Even limiting comparisons to IP, the differences in legal nature and function of patents and trademarks 
international registration systems are stark. For a systematic comparative analysis, see FREDERICK ABBOTT, 
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IP legislation has a long history of establishing registration systems, tailored to the needs of the 
intangible goods in question.134 These systems have not remained static over the course of time, 
as the policy objectives and legal function attributed to registration have evolved. New registers 
have been created to accommodate novel forms of intellectual property and technologies,135 
while registers that were once pivotal have been shuttered.136  
In the 19th and 20th centuries, multilateral conventions both ushered in the creation of 
international IP registration mechanisms and promoted the harmonization of fundamental 
aspects of national registers. Notably, these initiatives did not extend to the rules governing the 
registration of contracts involving IP rights and,137 thus, the international landscape remains 
profoundly disjointed.138 These discrepancies are especially evident when comparing the legal 
regimes applicable to license agreements.139 In some jurisdictions, registration of these 
contracts is optional and purely carries a function of public notice. 140 In others, registration is 
required for licenses to be effective against third parties141 and may also serve as a priority 
                                                 
THOMAS COTTIER & FRANCIS GURRY, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD 
ECONOMY 2–3 (3 ed. 2015); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (4 ed. 2015).  
134 In the United States for copyright see RICKETSON AND GINSBURG, supra note 12; for patents see ROBERT P. 
MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS (6 ed. 2015); F. SCOTT KIEFF ET 
AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (6 ed. 2016); for trademarks GRAEME B. DINWOODIE 
& MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY (2013). 
135 For example, registration systems for plant varieties have been introduced worldwide over the past thirty years, 
see MARGARET LLEWELYN & MIKE ADCOCK, EUROPEAN PLANT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2006) (for the EU 
legal framework); Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, US Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury...?, 39 HOUST. L. 
REV. 727, 739–745 (2002) (for the United States registration system); S. K. Verma, TRIPS and plant variety 
protection in developing countries, 17 EUR. INTELLECT. PROP. REV. 281 (1995) (for a comparative international 
perspective). 
136 A pertinent example is the copyright register that used to be held at Stationers’ Hall in England. It ceased to 
function in its legal capacity in February 2000, after almost three centuries of service. On its history see CYPRIAN 
BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS’ COMPANY. A HISTORY 1403-1959 (1960); JOHN FEATHER, A HISTORY OF BRITISH 
PUBLISHING (1988); SHERMAN AND BENTLY, supra note 41 at 71, 181, 184. Notably, for a brief time, Stationers’ 
Hall also served as a “quasi-official” register for trademarks, see TRUEMAN WOOD, THE REGISTRATION OF TRADE 
MARKS 21-22 (1875). 
137 However, the recent WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Trademark Licenses (available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/marks/835/pub835.pdf) might signal a change of direction. 
138 On these international conventions see RICKETSON AND GINSBURG, supra note 12; REINBOTHE AND VON 
LEWINSKI, supra note 12; VON LEWINSKI, supra note 12; RICKETSON, supra note 12; STAUDER, supra note 12; 
NELSON, supra note 12; WINNER AND DENBERG, supra note 12; BEIER AND SCHRICKER, supra note 12; MALBON, 
LAWSON, AND DAVISON, supra note 12; for a recent systemic overview CALBOLI AND WERRA, supra note 12; for 
critical reflections on the harmonization of substantive IP law in the European Union see PILA AND OHLY, supra 
note 12. 
139 For a rich comparative analysis see AIPPI Contracts regarding Intellectual Property Rights (assignments and 
licenses) and third parties (Q190) [henceforth Q190] national reports available at 
http://aippi.org/committee/contracts-regarding-intellectual-property-rights-assignments-and-licenses-and-third-
parties-2/ and AIPPI Summary Report Q190 available at http://aippi.org/wp-
content/uploads/committees/190/SR190English.pdf. This disharmonised international legal landscape has also 
been analysed by the International Trademarks Association in its reports "Trademark Licensing Requirements in 
the EC and EFTA Countries," "Licensing Recordal Requirements in Asia and the Pacific," and "Licensing 
Requirements in Latin America- Caribbean" available at 
http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Pages/EliminationofMandatoryTrademarkLicenseRecordingRequirements.aspx. 
140 For example, this is the case in the United Stated for patent, trademarks licenses; see 35 USC § 261 (2002); 15 
USC § 1060 (2002). Licenses can be recorded for public notice, as detailed in Title 37 — Patents, Trademarks, 
and Copyrights. Copyright Office regulations codified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) – Part 3 (2014).  
141 For example, this is the case in the United Kingdom for patents and trademarks licenses under section 33 UK 
PA and section 25 UK TMA. The same is true in Spain under article 79 Spanish Patent law, and article 46 
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point in the resolution of conflicts between competing ayants cause.142 In others still, 
registration is required for a licensee to be able to bring actions against infringers.143 Notably, 
a small number of jurisdictions establish that licenses with defined attributes must be registered 
to be effective between the parties.144 
Academics, practitioners and international organizations concur that this legislative discord is 
a source of both uncertainty and elevated transaction costs. Opinions are deeply divided 
regarding the legal function that should be attributed to the registration of IP contracts 
generally, and license agreements in particular. 
One view is that registration should be required in order for IP licenses to be effective against 
third parties. The ratio is that documenting these transactions and the associated interests 
increases legal certainty systemically; moreover, it promotes the commercial exploitation of IP 
rights, by increasing the amount of information available to the public and facilitating 
regulatory supervision.145  
A different view is that registration of IP licenses should be optional. Proponents of this thesis 
suggest that such filings are time-consuming, costly and a source of administrative 
complications. They suggest that registration often fails to provide reliable information, as 
parties limit their disclosures or take steps to conceal their identity to keep their dealing 
confidential. Furthermore, they argue that the negative effects stemming from innocent failure 
to register IP licenses vastly outweigh the alleged benefits of compulsory registration.146 
The Project should consider formulating recommendations to harmonies this legal framework. 
It is submitted that conventional thinking is unlikely to garner consensus among Member 
States, as existing views are profoundly divergent and deeply entrenched. The Project should 
be mindful of the history of registration systems, yet should strive to look beyond the orthodoxy 
surrounding this topic. The operation and legal function of IP license registration would have 
                                                 
henceforth Spanish Trademarks law and article 59 Ley N° 20/2003, de 7 de julio, de Protección Jurídica del 
Diseño Industrial [Spanish Design law], and in Italy articles 138-140 Codice della proprietà industriale (decreto 
legislativo 10 febbraio 2005, n. 30, as modified by decreto-legge 24 gennaio 2012, n. 1, and adopted by legge 24 
marzo 2012, n. 270) [henceforth Italian Industrial Property Code]. 
142 An important distinction needs to be drawn between two different approaches. Some legal systems set the 
priority point at the time of registration; for example, this the case under articles 138-140 Italian Industrial 
Property Code. Other jurisdictions establish that the priority point for third party effectiveness is moment when 
the license agreement was concluded, provided that the agreement in question has been subsequently registered; 
this is the case under section 33 UK PA and section 25 UK TMA. In the United States, there is no mandatory 
registration for copyright licenses, both non-exclusive and exclusive; however, under 17 USC § 205 (2010) 
recording of an exclusive license serves as constructive notice to third parties; moreover, under USC § 205(d) 
(2010) it is held that between conflicting transferees (including exclusive licensees) a later recorded interest 
prevails over a prior unrecorded interest, provided that the latter has not been registered within one month after 
its execution. See generally NIMMER AND DODD, supra note 8 § 5:59. 
143 For example, registration is required in Spain, see AIPPI Spain Report 190 available at 
https://aippi.org/download/commitees/190/GR190spain.pdf. 
144 In Japan, this is the case for “Senyojisshiken–type exclusive licenses”, as detailed in AIPPI Japan Report Q190 
available at http://aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/committees/190/GR190japan.pdf. The same is true in the 
Philippines for specific types of technology transfer licenses as detailed in AIPPI Philippines Report Q190 
available at http://aippi.org/wp-content/uploads/committees/190/GR190philippines.pdf. 
145 This is the view espoused in AIPPI Resolution to Q190, available at http://aippi.org/wp-
content/uploads/committees/190/RS190English.pdf. 
146 This is the view championed by the International Trademarks Association, as reflected in “Board Resolution: 
Elimination of Mandatory Trademark License Recording Requirements” available at 
http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Pages/EliminationofMandatoryTrademarkLicenseRecordingRequirements.aspx. 
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to be considered prospectively. Crucially, in an increasingly digital economy, transaction-
recording systems could be built on decentralized, automated ledgers populated by self-
executing contracts.147 This type of registration system would introduce dynamics and 
mechanisms that differ profoundly from those associated with paper and electronic registers 
presently in operation. Legal thinking should not lap erratically at the coat-tails of technological 
innovation, but rather harness it resolutely to leverage its potential. 
G. Private international law: applicable law rules148 
Domestic legislation establishing private international law rules is typically shaped by 
international law instruments.149 In the past, these sources did not dedicate special attention to 
IP contracts, including licenses; by contrast, in recent times, legislatures, international 
organizations and legal scholars have reversed this trend, striving to develop the private 
international law legal framework for these agreements.150  
                                                 
147 Legal scholarship on blockchain technology, smart contracts and decentralized ledgers is expanding at a frantic 
pace; see generally, Trevor I. Kiviat, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions Notes, 65 
DUKE L.J. 569 (2015); Larissa Lee, New Kids on the Blockchain: How Bitcoin’s Technology Could Reinvent the 
Stock Market, 12 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 81 (2015); Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market 
Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N. Y. UNIV. J. LEGIS. PUBLIC POLICY 837 (2015); Garry 
Gabison, Policy Considerations for the Blockchain Technology Public and Private Applications, 19 SMU SCI. 
TECHNOL. L. REV. 327 (2016); Joshua A. T. Fairfield, BitProperty, 88 SOUTH. CALIF. L. REV. 805 (2014); Carla 
L. Reyes, Moving beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An 
Initial Proposal, 61 VILLANOVA L. REV. 191 (2016); Konstantinos Christidis & Michael Devetsikiotis, 
Blockchains and smart contracts for the internet of things, 4 IEEE ACCESS 2292 (2016). 
148 This paragraph focuses exclusively on private international law rules that are relevant to the law of obligations 
and IP law. Private international rules regulating branches of the law that are tangential to the Project, such as 
criminal law, are not considered. 
149 Primarily, the conventions developed and adopted by member states of The Hague Conference on Private 
International Law; see generally Hans Van Loon, The Hague Conference on Private International Law, 2 HAGUE 
JUSTICE J. 3 (2007); M. L. Saunders, The Hague Conference on Private International Law, AUST YBIL 115 
(1966); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 UNIV. CHIC. L. REV. 
1151 (2000) (theorizing a methodological approach to choice of law rules alternative to that adopte by The Hague 
Conference). Regional instruments can also have a relevant influence, as is the case in the European Union with 
Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) and Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), and Regulation 
(EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters; see generally MICHAEL MCPARLAND, 
THE ROME I REGULATION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS (2015); ANDREW DICKINSON, 
1 THE ROME II REGULATION: THE LAW APPLICABLE TO NON-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS (2010); CHESHIRE, 
NORTH & FAWCETT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Paul L.C. Torremans et al. eds., 15 ed. 2017). 
150 For a detailed analysis see Paul L.C. Torremans, Licenses and assignments of intellectual property rights under 
the Rome I regulation, 4 J. PRIV. INT. LAW 397 (2008); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a private international 
intellectual property law: the demise of territoriality, 51 WM MARY REV.711 (2009) (highlighting the different 
speed at which public international IP law and private international IP law have developed); Pedro Alberto De 
Miguel Asensio, Applicable law in the absence of choice to contracts relating to intellectual or industrial property 
rights,  in YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: VOLUME X (Andrea Bonomi & Paul Volken eds., 2009); 
CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 150 at 1; Paul L.C. Torremans, 
Questioning the principles of territoriality: the determination of territorial mechanisms of commercialisation: 
Copyright Law A Handbook of Contemporary Research, in COPYRIGHT LAW A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY 
RESEARCH (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2007); Pedro Alberto De Miguel Asensio, The law governing international 
intellectual property licensing agreements (a conflict of laws analysis),  in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 312–337 (Jacques de Werra ed., 2013); Paul L.C. Torremans, Private 
International Law Issues on the Internet.,  in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT: A EUROPEAN UNION AND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 369–396 (Irini A. Stamatoudi ed., 2016). 
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IP licenses are not ontologically transnational. The licensor, licensee, licensed IP rights and 
contract performance can all be tied to a single jurisdiction and thus subject to its law. Historical 
sources indicate that the overwhelming majority of transactions adhered to this paradigm 
throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.151 However, the past fifty years have heralded a 
progressive internationalization of these agreements. Increasingly, IP licenses involve parties 
located in distant jurisdictions, multiple IP rights protected by different States, and cross-border 
performance.152 The concurrence of these features breeds conflicts of laws, the disentanglement 
of which can be laborious.  
It is an established private international law tenet that a distinction must be drawn between 
proprietary and contractual matters when determining the law applicable to IP contracts.153 
Proprietary matters are those that concern the IP right itself, including its existence, validity, 
scope of protection, duration, whether it can be assigned and licensed, and the registration 
requirements for these dealings. The orthodox position is that the law applicable to these issues 
is that of the State protecting the IP right object of the contract (lex loci protectionis); parties 
are not at liberty to postulate otherwise.154  
Contractual matters are those that concern the mutual rights and obligations stipulated by the 
parties and the constituent elements of their agreement, including formation,155 interpretation, 
performance, breach, nullity and remedies.156 It is generally accepted that the law applicable to 
these facets is that governing the contract (lex contractus). Save for international mandatory 
provisions,157 parties can elect for their contract to be governed by their law of choice.158 
                                                 
151 See generally, SEVILLE, supra note 41 (providing insights into copyright licenses); Oren Bracha, United States 
Copyright, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW 335–372 (Isabella Alexander & H. 
Tomás Gómez-Arostegui eds., 2016) (offering an insight into copyright and licensing in the United States, prior 
to the tewentieth-century). 
152 See generally SHERMAN AND BENTLY, supra note 41; SEVILLE, supra note 41; Granstrand and others, supra 
note 41; Aoki, supra note 41; W. R. Cornish, The International Relations of Intellectual Property, 52 CAMB. L.J. 
46 (1993); David, supra note 41. 
153 Specifically on the challenges of characterization in IP license contracts see De Miguel Asensio, supra note 
150 at 323–325; Torremans, supra note 150 at 397–400; Carmen Otero García-Castrillón, Choice of law in IP: 
rounding off territoriality, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 421–469, 424–425 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2014). 
154 See generally CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 150 at 10; 
Torremans, supra note 150 at 400–402; De Miguel Asensio, supra note 150 at 320. Notably, lex loci protectionis 
does not apply ubiquitously to the taking of security in IP licenses. The private international law framework 
governing these transactions varies across jurisdictions and raises a variety of complex issues; see Andrea Tosato, 
Secured Transactions and IP licenses: comparative observations and reform suggestions, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. (2018) (highlighting the deficiencies of approaches currently adopted across jurisdictions and suggesting 
legal reform strategies). 
155 Formal validity of the contract must be distinguished from form requirements specifically established by IP 
law. The former is a matter for contract law governed by lex contractus, the latter is an IP law issues to which lex 
loci protectionis applies. 
156 Remedies here refers to the remedies available for breach of the IP license contract; these are distinct from 
remedies available for infringement, under IP law or criminal law. The former are established by contract law and 
thus governed by lex contractus, the latter stem from IP law and criminal law, and thus lex loci protectionis 
applies. 
157 Examples of such provisions include rules stemming from labor law, consumer law, competition law and 
restrictions on trade in dual-use technology, see Haimo Schack, Internationally Mandatory Rules in Copyright 
Licensing Agreements, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 115 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 
2005). 
158 The principle that parties are free to choose the law applicable to their contract is acknowledged across 
jurisdictions. For example, in the United States see (section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts); in the 
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In the absence of such a designation, lex contractus is established pursuant to the presumptive 
rules of the jurisdiction in question.159 Crucially, this is a source of divergences internationally, 
as shown by the following examples.  
In the United States, private international law rules are established at the federal level.160 Thus, 
the law applicable to a contract in which the parties have not stipulated a choice-of-law clause 
is determined pursuant to the rules each individual state. Crucially, states do not share a unitary 
approach in regulating this issue. A minority of states161 adhere to the lex loci contractus 
rule,162 largely following the principles established in sections 325-326 of the Restatement 
(First) of Conflicts.163 By contrast, a larger group of states164 have adopted rules that follow 
section 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts.165 This provision establishes that the 
applicable law to determine the rights and obligations of the parties “with regard to contractual 
issues” is governed by the law of the state which has “the most significant relationship” with 
that issue.166 Such a relationship should be assessed taking “into account” the following non-
exclusive list of  “contacts”: “(a) the place of contracting; (b) the place of negotiation of a 
contract; (c) the place of performance; (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract; and 
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, as well as place of business of 
the parties.”167 As a final principle, this section provides that if a contract were negotiated and 
performed in one state “the local law of this state will usually be applied.”168 
In the European Union, the relevant rules are found in the Rome I Regulation. Art 4(1) 
establishes fixed rules to ascertain the applicable law for a list of nominate contracts.169 Art 
                                                 
EU, see article 3 Rome I; in Japan Article 7 of the Japanese Private International Law Act 2006. For a detailed 
critical analysis in the context of IP licenses see Torremans, supra note 150 at 399–401; De Miguel Asensio, supra 
note 150 at 318–319; TOSHIYUKI KONO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 13.4 (2012); SYMEON SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 
484–485 (2008). 
159 See Torremans, supra note 150 at 401–404; De Miguel Asensio, supra note 150 at 320–321; SYMEONIDES, 
supra note 158 at §§ 484–485; KONO, supra note 158 at 13.1.2.  
160 Symeon C. Symeonides, American Federalism and Private International Law, 63 REV. HELL. DROIT INT. 537 
(2010). 
161 For the complete list and a granular analysis of the approach of each state see SYMEONIDES, supra note 158 § 
485. 
162 Under section 332 Restatement (First) of Conflicts, the scope of the lex loci contractus rule covered the 
following issues: the form of a contract, contractual capacity, mutual assent, consideration, fraud, illegality and 
other grounds for avoiding the contract; in depth Id. § 485.; KONO, supra note 158 at 13.1.2. 
163 For an analysis of these sections and the process that led from the Restatement (First) of Conflicts to the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts see Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts 
Restatment: A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REV.1248 (1997) (providing an exhaustive bibliography on this topic); 
SYMEONIDES, supra note 158 §§ 484-485. 
164 For the complete list see SYMEONIDES, supra note 158 §§ 488-497. 
165 For the complete list, Id.§§ 498-499. 
166 Section 1881(1) Restatement (Second) of Conflicts. Notably, this section also states that this assessment must 
be generally guided by the principles listed in section 6(2): “the needs of an interstate system; the relevant policies 
of the forum and other interested forums; the justified expectations of the parties; the basic foundational principles 
of the area of law at issue; the uniformity and predictability of the result; and the ease in determination and 
application”. 
167 Section 188(1) Restatement (Second) of Conflicts. 
168 Section 188(3) Restatement (Second) of Conflicts. Notably, sections 189-199, 203 Restatement (Second) of 
Conflicts establish special rules applicable to nominate contracts. However, IP license contracts are not included. 
169 Interestingly, under article 4(1) of an early draft proposal of the Rome I Regulation (COM (2005) 650 final) it 
was held that IP contracts should be governed by the law of the country in which “the person who transfers or 
assigns the rights has his habitual residence”. For an exegesis of this provision, see Torremans, supra note 150 at 
403–404. 
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4(2) holds that the applicable law to all other contract archetypes is that of the country where 
the party required to effect the characteristic performance has its habitual residence. Art 4(3) 
completes this provision, establishing an escape route: if the contract manifestly exhibits a 
“closer connection” with another country, its law will apply.170 In practice, the intricate nature 
of modern IP licenses results in the frequent application of the closest connection rule.171  
In Switzerland, the law applicable to IP contracts is that of the “place of habitual residence” of 
the transferor or licensor.172 In Japan, absent a choice-of-law clause agreed by the parties, the 
law applicable to an IP license agreement is that of the state with which there is the closest 
connection;173 however, neither rules nor guidance are supplied for the execution this 
assessment.174 
In light of this fragmented international legal framework, the Project may consider examining 
conflict of law rules applicable to IP license contracts.175 Member States would indubitably 
accept axiomatically the principle that proprietary matters are governed by lex loci protectionis, 
while contractual issues are regulated by the lex contractus. Similarly, they would accept 
unquestioningly that the parties are free to designate a law of their choosing for their agreement. 
Attention may instead be gainfully directed to two contentious problems that beset the 
application of these principles.  
First, the Project could elaborate guidelines to streamline and rationalize the process of 
characterization required to distinguish between matters that are deemed proprietary and those 
which are deemed contractual in IP license contracts. Though this distinction appears pellucid 
in theory, its clarity can be fatally wounded in the maws of a complex transaction in practice.176  
Secondly, Member States could consider developing a special rule for IP license agreements 
to determine the law governing contractual matters, absent a choice-of-law clause. In this task, 
they would have the opportunity to benefit from the conceptual arsenal developed by several 
                                                 
170 Article 4(4) establishes that the “closer connection” criterion also applies if the applicable law if the applicable 
law cannot be determined pursuant to either article 4(1) or 4(2). 
171 In depth see Torremans, supra note 150 at 404–420; De Miguel Asensio, supra note 150 at 322–325; CHESHIRE, 
NORTH & FAWCETT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 150 at 11; Yuko Nishitani, Contracts concerning 
intellectual property rights, in ROME I REGULATION: THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS IN 
EUROPE. MUNICH: SELLIER. EUROPEAN LAW PUBLISHERS 55–80, 74–80 (Franco Ferrari & Stefan Leible eds., 
2009); Peter Mankowski, Contracts Relating to Intellectual or Industrial Property Rights under the Rome I 
Regulation,  in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 39–60, 42–47 (Stefan Leible & 
Ansgar Ohly eds., 2009); Axel Metzeger, Transfer of Rights, License Agreements, and Conflict of Laws: Remarks 
on the Rome Convention of 1980 and the Current ALI Draft,  in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 60–89, 65–69 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2005). 
172 Article 122 Switzerland's Federal Code on Private International Law; for an exhaustive analysis see Adam 
Samuel, The New Swiss Private International Law Act, INT. COMP. LAW Q. 681, 686–687 (1988). 
173 Article 8 Japanese Private International Law Act 2006. 
174 In depth see KONO, supra note 158 at 13.2.2. 
175 Historically, UNCITRAL has primarily focused its effort on substantive rules. Nevertheless, in recent past, 
Member States have shown growing sensitivity towards private international law profiles. For example, see 
UNCITRAL “Supplement on Security Rights in Intellectual Property” Recommendation 248, Adopted by 
UNCITRAL in July 2010, Report of UNCITRAL on the work of its forty-third session, A/65/17, para. 227. This 
was a supplement to the UNCITRAL “Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions”, adopted by UNCITRAL in 
December 2007, Report of UNCITRAL on the work of its resumed fortieth session, A/62/17 (Part II), paras. 99–
100. 
176 See Torremans, supra note 150 at 398–402; De Miguel Asensio, supra note 150 at 314–318; Otero García-
Castrillón, supra note 153 at 424; KONO, supra note 158 at 11–13 (discussing the issue of characterisation 
exhaustively). 
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academic endeavors that have already preceded them on this journey over the past two decades: 
the American Law Institute (ALI) Intellectual Property Principles,177 the European Max Planck 
Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (CLIP) Principles,178 the Korean Private 
International Law Association (KOPILA) Principles,179 the Joint Japanese-Korean (J-K) 
Principles and the Transparency Proposal.180  
Each one of these academic endeavors contains a bespoke provision for the determination of 
the law applicable to IP contracts bereft of a choice-of-law clause. On the surface, they all 
accept the closest connection rule as the solution best suited to resolve the private international 
law conundrum under consideration.181 Alas, for the operation of this principle they rely on 
presumptions and interpretative factors that are not aligned and thus can yield diverging 
outcomes.182    
Ultimately, it would be for Member States to decide whether to espouse one of the approaches 
developed by any of these academic endeavors or ambitiously attempt to craft an alternative 
ruleset that bridges the chasms dividing them. It is submitted that this would not be a 
challenging decision in terms of its process; all attention could be devoted to substantive 
discussion. Regrettably, it is hard to imagine that consensus would be easily won on a 
battlefield upon which positions have been entrenched for the past two decades.  
Notably, the scope of the Project would decisively influence the approach to the present topic. 
An applicable law rule for IP licenses would not even be considered if private international law 
issues were out of scope. Furthermore, if the Project had a narrow scope, the palatability of this 
topic would be significantly reduced, as the notion of developing an applicable law rule 
restricted to a sub-group of all IP license agreements would imply increasing fragmentation in 
an area where harmonization is desired above all. 
                                                 
177 ALI INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW AND JUDGMENTS IN 
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2008); see generally Rochelle Dreyfuss, The ALI Principles on Transnational 
Intellectual Property Disputes: Why Invite Conflicts, 30 BROOK J INTL L 819 (2004); François Dessemontet, A 
European Point of View on the Ali Principles-Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of 
Law, and Judgements in Transnational Disputes, 30 BROOK J INTL L 849 (2004); Rochelle Dreyfuss, The 
American Law Institute Project on Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and 
Judgments in Transnational Disputes,  in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 15–31 
(Stefan Leible & Stefan Leible eds., 2009).  
178 PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (CLIP) (2011). For detailed commentary see 
EUROPEAN MAX PLANCK GROUP ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE CLIP PRINCIPLES AND COMMENTARY (2013). 
179 PRINCIPLES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY approved by KOPILA on 
March 26, (2010). For commentary see KONO, supra note 158 at 11–16 (comparing these principles to the Waseda, 
CLIPs and ALI Principles). 
180 JOINT PROPOSAL DRAFTED BY MEMBERS OF THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION OF KOREA AND 
JAPANESE WASEDA UNIVERSITY GLOBAL COE PROJECT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW PRINCIPLES (2010). Published in CGOE Quarterly Review of Corporation Law and Society, 112 (2011). See 
Id. at 11–16. (comparing these principles to the CLIPs and ALI Principles); Otero García-Castrillón, supra note 
153. 
181 See section 315(2) ALI Principles, article 3:502 (1) CLIP Principles, article 23.1 Kopila Principles, article 306 
(3) Transparency Proposal, and article 20.2 Waseda Principles. 
182 For a detailed analysis see De Werra, supra note 8 at 332–333; Otero García-Castrillón, supra note 153 at 442–
445 (accepting De Werra’s analysis and expanding it).   
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III. THE FORM OF THE PROJECT 
The preceding discussion on scope and substance offers a robust foundation from which to 
consider the form that the Project might assume and the associated implications.  
Over the past fifty years, UNCITRAL has developed and adopted “texts” that can be divided 
into three distinct form-categories: legislative, contractual and explanatory. The first, 
UNCITRAL texts in legislative form, are addressed to legislatures and are designed to be 
adopted by states through the enactment of domestic legislation. The three most common 
incarnations of UNCITRAL texts in legislative form are: conventions, model laws and 
legislative guides.183 The trait that distinguishes them is their manner of interaction with the 
legal order of states. 
If the Project were conceived as a convention, it would be configured as a multilateral 
instrument establishing a set of binding rules across ratifying states. Its function would be to 
repeal the rules currently governing IP license agreements at national level, replacing them 
with an internationally uniform legal regime.184  
If Member States opted for a model law instead, the Project would be developed as a soft law 
instrument setting out a “pattern”185 for a domestic statute.186 It would serve as a prefabricated 
template that states could unilaterally inject into their legal orders, according to their own 
timetable and priorities. Even for states not interested in adopting the entirety of this 
hypothetical model law, such a document would yield useful points of reference for less 
ambitious reform interventions.187  
Alternatively, the Project could take the form of a legislative guide. Such a text would table a 
reasoned commentary on the legal issues presently affecting IP license agreements, consider 
alternative normative approaches, and articulate principles and recommendations to overcome 
them. If the Project were realized as a legislative guide, it would serve as a comprehensive 
                                                 
183 UNCITRAL has also adopted model provisions, albeit infrequently; see for example Provisions on a universal 
unit of account and on adjustment of the limit of liability in international transport conventions (1982), Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-Seventh Session, Supplement No. 17 and corrigenda (A/37/17 and 
Corr.1 and 2), para. 63. 
184 For example, such a text would follow the steps of the CISG, United Nations Convention on the Assignment 
of Receivables in International Trade (New York, 2001) available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/receivables/ctc-assignment-convention-e.pdf, The  United 
Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit (New York, 1995) available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/guarantees/guarantees.pdf, and recently The United Nations 
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (New York, 2014) (the "Mauritius 
Convention on Transparency") available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-
convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf. 
185 As described by UNCITRAL at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts_faq.html 
186 Notably UNCITRAL mode laws are frequently accompanied by guides to enactment that provide extensive 
explanatory information. For example, the UNCITRAL Model Laws on Electronic Commerce; the UNCITRAL 
Electronic Signatures; Cross-Border Insolvency; the UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions were all 
supported by ad hoc guided to enactments. 
187 For example, such a text would follow the steps of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures (2001) 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/ml-elecsig-e.pdf and recently the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records (2017), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/MLETR.pdf. 
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source of information for states considering legal reform initiatives and facilitate international 
harmonization.188  
Looking to the second form-category, UNCITRAL texts in contractual form are addressed to 
contracting parties, providing them with model contract clauses or special rules.189 Texts in this 
form rely entirely on party autonomy: they offer model terms or rules that can be directly or 
indirectly incorporated into contracts without modifications.   
If Member States chose this form for the Project, they would craft model clauses, based on 
recognized international best practices, which licensors and licensees could include in their 
contracts to govern specific issues.190  
The third form-category, UNCITRAL texts in explanatory form, expressly target contracting 
parties and aim to provide them actionable indications regarding select international trade law 
transactions. Texts in this form typically appear in one of two191 possible embodiments: legal 
guides or practice guides. The primary difference between them lies in the type of information 
that they include.  
If the Project were structured as an explanatory legal guide, it would offer a comprehensive 
analysis of the negotiation, drafting and performance of IP license agreements based on the 
extant legal framework. By contrast, if it were fashioned as a practice guide, the emphasis of 
the Project would be on elucidating practical aspects of these transactions, such as detailing 
conduct that parties can follow to expedite negotiations and simplify contract performance.  
Having reviewed the different forms that can be assumed by UNCITRAL texts, attention can 
turn to the process for their selection. Member States are not bound by established rules or a 
mandatory procedure; their decision is customarily based on a plethora of considerations that 
includes social, political, economic and legal factors. Though any prediction regarding the 
dynamics of this decision-making process is necessarily conjectural, one might speculate that 
it would break down into two stages. 
Member States would be required to choose which form-category would be best suited to the 
Project. It is submitted that a rigorous decision-making process would be contingent on two 
connected decisions. 
First, UNCITRAL texts in legislative form differ ontologically from those in a contractual and 
explanatory form. The former are addressed to institutions that hold legislative power. Their 
purpose is to inspire law reform across jurisdictions, achieving both amelioration of national 
                                                 
188 For example, such a text would follow the steps of Such a project would follow the examples of the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Parts I and II (2004) available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf, and the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
on Insolvency Law, Part III (2010), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Leg-Guide-
Insol-Part3-ebook-E.pdf, the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part IV available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Leg-Guide-Insol-Part4-ebook-E.pdf. 
189 A Guide to UNCITRAL Basic facts about the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law para 50, 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-57491-Guide-to-UNCITRAL-e.pdf. 
190 For example, such a text would follow the steps of The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976, revised in 2010) 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf, 
and the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules (1980) available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/conc-rules/conc-rules-e.pdf.  
191 A third type of explanative text are interpretative declarations. These instruments provide the official 
interpretation of a previously adopted UNCITRAL instrument. To date none have yet been adopted.  
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legal frameworks and international harmonization. This nature is shared by all incarnations in 
which UNCITRAL texts in legislative form are expressed, despite the differences in the 
manners in which they pursue law reform. By contrast, UNCITRAL texts in contractual and 
explanatory forms accept the existing national legal frameworks and refrain from attempting 
to amend them. Their purpose is to influence both the manner in which private parties structure 
and perform their transactions, and how the judiciary approaches their enforcement. The 
ultimate ambition is to improve and harmonies business practices. 
It would be for Member States to appraise where the greater benefit might lie: in an 
UNCITRAL text addressed to legislatures and focused on legislative reform, or on one directed 
to private parties and aimed at influencing their market behavior. At first glance, it might be 
tempting to favor a form-category that does not require legislative reform, owing to the well-
documented difficulties associated with such processes.192 Nevertheless, a Project concentrated 
on influencing how parties structure and perform their IP licenses might have limited traction 
due to the varying limitations imposed by national legislations on the initiatives of licensors 
and licensees. Accordingly, heedful consideration of the intended scope of the Project would 
be paramount to any discussion on its form. 
Secondly, once agreement had been reached on the form-category for the Project, it would be 
for Member States to assess which incarnation would be best suited for its purposes. If they 
opted for a text in legislative form, it is submitted that neither a convention nor a model law 
would be an adequate choice. These instruments do not afford the degree of flexibility that 
Member States would require to arrive at compromise solutions bridging the divergences that 
presently characterize the international landscape for IP licensing.  
Only a legislative guide would offer the necessary elasticity for a positive outcome. Notably, 
the legislative recommendations enshrined in instruments of this type are expressed in looser 
terms than those demanded by the articles of a model law or a convention; similarly, a 
legislative guide can recommend a range of alternative normative solutions to address 
contentious policy choices, rather than having to establish a single rule, as is the case in 
conventions and model laws. A model law, and perhaps even a convention, might follow in the 
future, but a legislative guide would have to serve as a bridgehead towards consensus.  
By contrast, if Member States decided that the Project should not take a legislative form, it is 
submitted that a text in explanatory form structured as a legal guide would be the preferable 
option. The rationale is similar to that previously offered in support of a legislative guide. The 
Project would greatly benefit from assuming a form that allowed for flexibility, favored 
compromise solutions and offered Member States the opportunity to explain their policy 
choices in accompanying commentary. Neither a contractual text nor an explanatory practice 
guide would satisfy these requirements. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
IP licenses are the leading lady of the information age; the strategic and economic significance 
of this contract archetype have grown exponentially over the past 40 years. Under this glaring 
spotlight, it has become progressively more apparent that the legal framework governing these 
                                                 
192 See Jurgen Basedow, Worldwide Harmonisation of Private Law and Regional Economic Integration - General 
Report Worldwide Harmonisation of Private Law and Regional Economic Integration, UNIF. L. REV. 31, 31–36 
(2003) (describing the difficulties encountered in stimulating law reform in harmony with UNCITRAL texts); 
Spiros V. Bazinas, Harmonisation of International and Regional Trade Law: The UNCITRAL Experience 
Worldwide Harmonisation of Private Law and Regional Economic Integration: Views and Comments from 
International Organisations, UNIF. L. REV. 53 (2003) (providing the perspective of the UNCITRAL Secretariat). 
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transactions is ill-suited to the role that they play in the modern digital environment. As the 
world becomes ever more connected, the shortcomings of this body of rules will grow ever 
more apparent, and calls for reform ever louder. 
UNCITRAL has been quietly appraising and evaluating the international legal framework 
governing IP license contracts for the past ten years, with Member States pondering the features 
that a project in this area of commercial law might assume.  
At present, this initiative remains at an early stage of its gestation. In the hope of nurturing its 
growth, this paper has ventured to explore its possible scope, content and form. The objective 
has not been to articulate or advocate a single, concrete proposal, but rather to first identify the 
categories of legal issues that Member States would face in the elaboration of this project, then 
lend color to the types of decision-making processes required for consensus solutions.   
In charting the hypothetical scope of such a project, it was submitted that Member States should 
assess two legal dimensions coextensively. One would involve electing either to examine all 
rules governing IP licenses holistically, or to limit the ambit of the analysis to those stemming 
from predetermined branches of the law. The other would require choosing whether to bring 
all license types into scope, or merely those with a predetermined set of features. 
Subsequently, attention shifted to substance. Select facets of the legal regime governing IP 
licenses were reviewed, ranging from the norms regulating the licensing of jointly-owned IP 
rights to the conflict of law rules that apply to these agreements, encountering pre-contractual 
negotiations, formation, content, contract construction and registration along the way.  
Three issues emerged consistently. First, the body of rules governing licenses suffers from a 
degree of under-elaboration, as the intersections of IP and contract law frequently fail to 
generate norms that adequately cater to the peculiarities of these transactions. Secondly, 
national laws governing different types of IP rights establish licensing rules that diverge far 
more than can be justified by underlying distinctions in the protected immaterial goods. 
Thirdly, crucial aspects of IP licensing agreements are regulated heterogeneously across 
jurisdictions, severely hindering international transactions.  
Two indications surfaced in the appraisal of the types of decision-making processes that would 
be conducive to the elaboration of unanimously-agreed solutions. First, the scope of the project 
would profoundly affect the types of issues confronted by Member States and the range of 
available normative solutions. Secondly, as Member States would often be addressing issues 
that arise at the intersection of multiple branches of the law, substantial effort should be devoted 
to the isolating the conceptual formants of the matters under consideration. 
The lattermost element of this inquiry analyzed the possible alternative forms that this project 
might assume. The three form-categories developed by UNCITRAL for its texts were 
expounded in turn. It was posited that the main hurdle for Member States to overcome would 
be reaching a consensus on the angle from which they wish to approach the legal regime for IP 
license contracts. This issue is one of reform strategy. It would be for Member States to 
establish whether it would be more palatable to tackle the extant shortcomings of the 
framework for IP licensing by advocating legal reform, or rather through the development of 
model license agreements that rely on private law-making.  
The preceding analysis provides fertile ground for reflection on potential future developments. 
It is submitted that the next step to advance the cause of an UNCITRAL project on the law of 
IP licensing is to articulate a concrete proposal. Ideally, it should be jointly authored by a group 
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of Member States; alternatively, it could be prepared by NGOs or a group of academics and 
practitioners, then submitted for the attention of UNCITRAL Member States. 
Based on the findings of this paper, such a proposal should be built on two pillars. First, it 
should incisively delineate a scope that is both precisely defined from a legal perspective, and 
socio-economically palatable. As this would be UNCITRAL’s first foray into the law of IP 
licensing, temptations to cast this net too broadly should be resisted staunchly. Crucially, with 
regard to the areas of the law to be covered, it might be advisable to focus solely on contract 
law, IP law and international private law; areas such as competition law, consumer law and 
labor law might be best left aside, owing to the elevated number of additional variables that 
they would bring to the fore. Equally, it might be advisable to exclude licenses which carry 
features that are treated in multifarious, manifestly different ways at a national level, as to 
include them would create difficulties irreconcilable a priori.  
Secondly, this proposal should state pellucidly the form-category that this project should 
assume, and substantiate its choice robustly. Based on the level of disharmony that presently 
characterizes national legal framework governing IP licenses, a text in legislative form might 
be the preferable option. It seems unlikely that an explanatory or contractual UNCITRAL 
initiative would successfully circumvent the obstacles raised by the numerous mandatory rules 
presently characterizing the law of several jurisdiction. 
This proposal should also devote attention to substance. At this stage, it would be adequate to 
confine discussion to simply identifying the relevant subject matter to be covered within the 
suggested scope. The aspiration would be to express a level of detail sufficient to describe the 
key matters that would be covered, yet does not deprive Member States of the necessary 
maneuvering space during subsequent negotiations.   
Finally, as ever in international legal projects of this nature, political will and conviction would 
be integral to the favorable reception of this proposal by UNCITRAL. Any project seeking to 
address the law of IP licensing would inevitably encounter thorny negotiations, as it would be 
impossible to circumvent historically contentious legal postulates. This may at first glance 
render this project unappealing, particularly for those Member States that may be bruised by 
past, failed attempts to reform domestic IP licensing laws. Nevertheless, complexity alone 
should not deter Member States from striking boldly down this path, as the anticipated benefits 
of a coherent legal regime in this space would by far outweigh the hardships encountered in 
their pursuit.  
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